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ABSTRACT
Human capital production is central to economic wellbeing from a national
perspective: it improves productivity, spurs technological innovation, and promotes
sustainable economic growth over time. Equally important, investments in human capital
are central to economic wellbeing at the individual level. College graduates tend to earn
more money, are more employable, are better able to manage economic downturns, and
have even been shown to have better health. Moreover, for many students, the college
experience is an important lesson in living independently, developing social and
professional networks, and generally taking on more responsibility in one’s life. It has
been said that pursuing a degree in higher education is the largest investment one can
make for the future. This work employs a variety of empirical strategies to better
understand how students make choices regarding college: where to attend, what to study,
and whether to work during college or not, for example.
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Chapter 1 provides background on two contentious issues in American higher
education: the changing structure of financial aid and the longstanding trend of
lengthening time to baccalaureate degree in the United States. Traditional financial aid
has included subsidized and non-subsidized loans, need-based financial aid (e.g., Federal
Pell Grant Program), and targeted merit-based financial aid, such as academic or athletic
scholarships. However, the early 1990s saw the advent of a new type of financial aid:
broad-based, state merit-based aid scholarships. I provide background information on
how such scholarships are generally structured, paying special attention to New Mexico’s
program, the New Mexico Legislative Lottery Scholarship (NMLLS). Chapter 1 then
discusses longstanding trends in the time it takes undergraduate students to earn
bachelor’s degrees in the United States. Focus is targeted at the potential costs of this
phenomenon to state budgets, institutions, and the students themselves. Chapter 1
concludes by discussing responses to this trend by lawmakers and higher education
officials, and whether such responses are warranted.
Using a rich administrative data set from New Mexico’s flagship university,
Chapter 2 examines whether the NMLLS resulted in any meaningful change in 4-, 5-, and
6-year completion rates comparing qualified resident students to nonqualified nonresident
students before and after the program became effective. Propensity score matching is
performed to mitigate any observable differences between resident and nonresidents. We
find no overall completion effects in the aggregate, but do find economically meaningful
divergent completion effects by academic preparation. It appears that results may be
driven by students from families whose financial constraints are binding.
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Chapter three investigates whether college graduates suffer a wage penalty in the
labor market for taking longer than traditional standards to complete an undergraduate
degree. We view this as a test of whether employers view time to degree as a
productivity signal in the labor market. According to human capital theory, there should
be no wage penalty if students are accumulating the same amount of credits at a slower
rate. However, if employers view lengthened time to degree as a negative productivity
signal, then one would expect a wage penalty. Previous literature has found large and
statistically significant wage penalties associated with lengthened time to degree, but we
are not convinced they have adequately addressed the endogeneity of time to degree in
the student wage equation. When we address endogeneity by controlling for institutional
quality, student ability, and instrumenting for the student’s own time to degree with the
average time to degree at their institution, we find no evidence that employers view
lengthened time to degree as a negative productivity signal.
Chapter 4 uses the same data set and methods as Chapter 2, but examines
students’ choice of majors. I argue that one potential unintended consequence of broadbased merit scholarships is to discourage students from attempting more difficult majors,
such as STEM, in order to maximize the likelihood of scholarship retaining. This may be
particularly true for marginally academically prepared students. I find no evidence that
either the likelihood of first majoring in a STEM field or earning a degree in STEM is
affected in the aggregate by the enactment of the NMLLS. Statistically significant effects
emerge when disaggregating by academic preparation, however—academically less
prepared students are less likely to pursue a STEM major as a result of the NMLLS,
while more academically prepared students are more likely to first major in a STEM
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field. This is in accordance with the previous literature as well as the theoretical model
offered in the paper.
Chapter 5 concludes, with a summary of main results from Chapters 2 through 4,
with special attention being paid to the policy implication of these findings. Chapter 5
also offers suggestions for future work.
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Chapter 1:

Introduction: Merit aid, student decisions, and employer responses

This work focuses on two major issues which have garnered significant attention
in higher education over the previous two decades. The first is the changing structure of
financial aid in the United States. Traditionally, students have either financed higher
education out of their own pockets (or their parents’ pockets) or through loans, needbased financial aid, or academic or athletic scholarships. Since the early 1990s, however,
a new type of funding mechanism has been popularized: state merit aid scholarships.
Such scholarships tend to be very generous in that they generally cover all or nearly all of
a qualifying students direct college costs. State merit aid scholarships are broad in the
sense that they are generally available to all in-state resident students meeting some sort
of academic criteria. Many of these scholarship are at least partially funded by proceeds
from state lottery ticket sales. Such scholarships are meant to increase access to higher
education for students from families that would otherwise not be able to afford college, or
may not be motivated to finish high school since they otherwise assume they would not
be able to afford college afterwards.
Currently, at least 27 states have some form of merit aid scholarship, each with
varying initial and renewal requirements. As an example of a broad-based, generous
state merit aid scholarship, consider the first and most studied scholarship of its kind,
Georgia’s Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally scholarship, or HOPE. The
program was launched in 1993 and provides full tuition and fees to qualifying students.
Initial qualifications include being a state resident of Georgia and graduating from high
school with a minimum 3.0 cumulative grade point average (GPA). Renewal of the
scholarship requires maintaining a cumulative 3.0 GPA in college, and students may
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continue to receive the award for up to seven years, until they attempt 127 credit hours, or
complete a bachelor’s degree—whichever comes first. As of 2010, approximately 43
percent of all undergraduates in the University of Georgia System were receiving HOPE
(Sjoquist and Winters, 2015a). Despite the popularization of state merit aid scholarships
such as HOPE, many questions remain regarding possible unintended consequences of
generous financial aid tied to modest academic requirements.
The second major phenomenon that has garnered significant attention from
university officials, lawmakers, and even state and federal governments is lengthening
time to baccalaureate degree in the United States. Since the 1970s, the time it takes a
student to complete a bachelor’s degree has steadily risen. For example, 58 percent
college graduates from the 1972 high school class graduated in four years or less; this
figure dropped to 44 percent for the 1992 high school class (Bound and Turner, 2010).
More recent data suggest this trend has continued. This has caused alarm for several
reasons, including the straining of resources at universities, inefficient spending of state
and federal appropriations, and suboptimal labor market outcomes for students taking
longer than the traditional four years to complete their undergraduate studies. Recently,
states have been taking matters into their own hands by proposing punishments for those
that do not remain on-track to graduate within four years. In 2012 alone, five state
legislatures passed laws aimed at reducing time to degree. In the wake of all the attention
paid to baccalaureate time to degree by policymakers, it is worth asking whether all of the
concern is justified.
Chapter 2 focuses on New Mexico’s state merit aid scholarship, the New Mexico
Legislative Lottery Scholarship (NMLLS). The NMLLS is unique in that it has the
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lowest academic requirements of any state merit aid scholarship. To qualify, one only
needs to be a state resident, graduate from a New Mexico high school, and immediately
enroll in any one of 16 qualified in-state institutions. In-state institutions then
automatically award a “Bridge to Success Scholarship” that pays all tuition and fees in
the student’s first semester. If the student earns a minimum 2.5 GPA and completes at
least 12 credit hours in this first semester, they are then eligible for the NMLLS. The
NMLLS pays full tuition and fees for up to four additional years beyond the “bridging”
semester as long as students maintain a cumulative 2.5 GPA and complete at least 12
credit hours per semester. Beyond its low academic requirements, the NMLLS is also
unique in that it is the only state merit aid scholarship where initial eligibility
requirements are based on college—not high school—performance.
Using a rich administrative data set that covers the population of students over a
ten-year period, we examine how this “low-bar” state merit aid scholarship promotes
graduation. This is an empirical question from the outset: one would expect that relaxing
financial constraints for students, perhaps even affording them the opportunity to not
have to work during college and spend more time studying, would result in higher
graduation rates. However, low-bar nature of initial and renewal eligibility requirements
may incentivize some students to attend a college they otherwise would not have without
the scholarship. If the scholarship results in an influx of marginally academically
prepared students, then perhaps graduation rates would suffer. I attempt to answer this
question by using a sophisticated difference-in-differences matching estimator using
qualified resident students as the treatment group and nonresident (and therefore
nonqualified) students as the control group. Propensity score matching is performed to
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mitigate any observable differences between residents and nonresidents, and the success
of the matching algorithm is examined using recent statistical diagnostic tests developed
by Imbens and Rubin (2015). I also examine the feasibility of using regression
discontinuity design to examine the relationship between merit aid and college
completion, which itself is an implicit test of whether students are able to strategically
“game” NMLLS eligibility requirements. Although results suggest no overall completion
effects resulting from the NMLLS, meaningful divergent effects appear when
disaggregating the sample by academic preparation—more academically prepared
students exhibited positive completion effects while less academically prepared students
exhibited negative completion effects.
Chapter 3 revisits previous literature to examine the latest trends in increasing
time to baccalaureate degree in the United States. Using a restricted nationallyrepresentative longitudinal study from the Department of Education, we ask whether
students that overshoot the traditional four-year graduation mark are penalized in the
labor market. Another way of looking at this research question is: does baccalaureate
time to degree serve as a productivity signal in the United States? From one perspective,
human capital theory predicts that time to degree should not matter if students are
acquiring the same amount of human capital over a longer period of time (assuming
human capital does not depreciate). From another perspective, employers may view
lengthier time to degree as a negative productivity signal. If so, and assuming wages
reflect productivity, there would be a wage penalty associated with longer time to degree.
Testing for this is not straightforward, and the previous literature is not able to overcome
endogeneity issues. Because variables such as student ability1 and school quality are
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correlated with both time to degree and future earnings, this is an identification problem
that needs to be addressed. I address this endogeneity problem using instrumental
variables techniques and provide an update to previous literature on this subject. We find
that we are able to replicate wage penalties found in previous studies which appeal to
ordinary least squares, but instrumental variables reveals no such wage penalties for
lengthened time to degree. These results suggest that previous studies of the relationship
between time to degree and wages suffer from significant bias.
Chapter 4 revisits the NMLLS with another question about unintended
consequences. Merit aid tied to academic requirements, in general, may result in the
perverse outcome of students pursuing easier courses of study in order to maximize their
chances of scholarship retention. Given the nation’s preoccupation with promoting
degrees in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), I ask whether the
NMLLS dissuades scholarship recipients from pursuing majors in STEM and whether the
scholarship results in lower STEM degree production. Previous literature on the subject
finds either null or negative effects of state merit aid on STEM degree production
(Cornwell et al., 2006; Sjoquist and Winters, 2015a). Since the matching algorithm from
Chapter 2 does not consider any outcomes—only covariates—and is considered
successful, we appeal to the same difference-in-differences matching estimator and
diagnostic testing procedures. The main contribution of this chapter is that we use a rich
administrative data that allows for a much more detailed analysis relative to previous
literature. In particular, we test for major choice effects in the aggregate, but also
disaggregate by academic preparation, something not attempted in previous studies.
Results reveal no effect of the NMLLS on either first majoring in a STEM field or
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eventually earning a STEM degree, however divergent effects are again found by
academic preparation—less academically prepared students are less likely to first declare
a major in STEM, while more academically prepared students are more likely to do so.
In Chapter 5, main conclusions and policy implications are revisited and extended
discussion is provided. Particular attention will be paid to the scientific contributions
from each chapter, and how these contributions fit into the broader field of the economics
of education. This chapter also discusses policy implications and methodological
limitations, and concludes by offering direction for future research in the above areas.
The main argument in this dissertation is that unintended consequences may occur
when we design policies in higher education to broadly subsidize students or to restrict
their behavior. Giving generous amounts of merit aid to students that are perhaps
marginally qualified for postsecondary studies may result in the unintended consequence
of promoting overmatching in higher education, which sets up some students for failure.
Such programs also have the consequence of changing students’ choice of major, and
therefore ultimately their career paths. Although the intentions are well-placed, the
outcomes are sometimes suboptimal. This is true of proposals to punish students that
wish to take a nontraditional path to a baccalaureate degree. Students are rational actors
in the economy, and spending time and money legislating their college choices is an
inefficient allocation of resources. Sometimes the best remedy is no remedy at all.
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Notes

1

We use the term “ability” not to describe the innate characteristics of the student,

but to instead describe a constructed measure, such as academic preparation, for example.
As such, it is not intended to provide negative connotation for any students included in
the sample.
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Chapter 2:

Does broad-based merit aid improve college completion? Evidence

from New Mexico's lottery scholarship
We use the natural experiment of a state lottery scholarship to measure the effect of
generous financial aid on graduation rates at New Mexico’s flagship public university.
During the study period, the scholarship program paid full tuition for eight semesters for
any state resident earning a 2.5 GPA in their first semester at any public 2-year or 4-year
college. We find a significant positive completion effect of 9.4 percentage points (16.8
percent) for academically well-prepared students that is offset by a nearly equal and
opposite negative effect for less prepared students. We posit that the scholarship
program, which effectively erased the difference in tuition at 2- and 4-year colleges, may
have induced weaker students to take their chances on a more prestigious, yet riskier,
academic path.
2.1 Introduction
The introduction of broad, merit-based college scholarships in the 1990s created a
natural experiment for measuring relationships between college costs and academic
outcomes. State merit-based scholarships generally fund most if not all tuition for
qualified resident students. State legislation establishing merit-based scholarships share
several common goals: retaining talent in-state, increasing access to higher education by
reducing financial burdens, and promoting timely completion. There is considerable
variation in initial and continuing eligibility requirements across states. Researchers have
cataloged how such programs affect enrollment and course taking behavior, and, more
recently, degree completion. We analyze the effect of the New Mexico Legislative
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Lottery Scholarship (NMLLS), a uniquely “low-bar” merit-based scholarship, on degree
completion.
Since the 1993, at least 25 states have implemented merit-based scholarships, the
first and most studied being Georgia’s Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally, or
HOPE, scholarship program.2 HOPE marked the beginning of what has been a major
restructuring of the financial aid landscape in America. According to the College Board,
from 1993 to 2013, the percentage of total undergraduate state grant aid for which
students’ financial circumstances were considered decreased from 90 percent to 76
percent. In the 2013-2014 academic year, New Mexico was one of 13 states where this
percentage was below 40 percent.3
We know more about the relationship between financial aid and enrollment than
financial aid and college completion. Different types of financial aid have varying effects
on college enrollment. Loans tend to have little to no effect, while grants have a positive
and significant effect on student enrollment (Linsenmeier et al. 2006). Students from
low-income families and students of color seem to be most responsive to such aid. Van
der Klaauw (2002) demonstrates that students’ choice of college are sensitive to financial
aid offers. Several studies show a significant and positive relationship between grant aid
and student enrollment (Seftor and Turner, 2002; Kane, 2003; Heller, 2009) and a
negative relationship between net cost and enrollment (McPherson and Schapiro 1991).
The effects of merit-based aid on enrollment have also been well documented. In an
experimental setting, Monks (2009) finds large, positive effects of merit aid on
enrollment. Studying HOPE, Dynarski (2000) finds that a $1,000 award increased
student enrollment by approximately four percent. Also studying HOPE, Cornwell et al.
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(2006) find the program increased student enrollment by 6 percent. In New Mexico,
Binder and Ganderton (2002, 2004) find that while the NMLLS boosted enrollment at
four-year colleges in New Mexico, the effect appears to be driven by additional
enrollment of students that otherwise would have attended college out-of-state.
The NMLLS was specifically designed to increase access to higher education and
encourage students to finish high school. The bill’s sponsor, Senator Michael Sanchez,
discussed the impetus for the program, noting:
…when I went to high school, I saw a lot of my friends, a lot of other
individuals, who had to drop out of school to either go on to the service to
help provide for their families or work on family farms or get some kind of
job to help their families out in this area.
…we just thought that, what is an incentive to try to keep people in school? …
Talking to different people … it was always a matter of well, ‘why should we
finish high school because even if we graduate from high school, we’re not
going to be able to afford to go to college.’ (Ness 2008, pp. 36)
While making higher education widely accessible is certainly a noble objective,
effective merit-based aid programs should also increase degree completion. Although
there is likely a positive productivity signal sent by those whose highest level of
education is “some college, no degree,” research suggests that the returns to such
attainment are far exceeded by earning a bachelor’s degree (Arrow, 1973; Jaeger and
Page, 1996). Degree completion is associated with better health, increased earnings, and
overall happiness (Card, 1999; Cuñado and de Gracia, 2012; Schafer et al., 2013).
We examine how the NMLLS affects college completion at the University of
New Mexico (UNM) by exploring changes in completion rates before and after the
implementation of the scholarship for eligible resident students and a matched sample of
nonresident (and therefore ineligible) students. Estimates reveal no significant overall
effect of the program on completion rates. However, we do find large and statistically
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significant completion effects after disaggregating by high school performance.
Academically well-prepared eligible freshmen are 9.4 percentage points (16.8 percent)
more likely to graduate within six years, compared to ineligible peers with similar high
school GPAs. Less academically-prepared freshmen are approximately 8.7 percentage
points (27.5 percent) less likely than their ineligible peers to graduate within six years.
These opposite responses dampen the overall effect of the NMLLS. Further
decomposition by family income suggests that low-income students likely drive this
pattern.
Findings are informative to states with existing broad-based merit scholarships
and those contemplating launching programs of their own. Because the NMLLS covers
all tuition over our sample period 4 for many high school graduates, effectively removing
price differentials between universities, our research also informs recent proposals to
make college “free” for students with family incomes under $125,000. 5 Our results
support the idea that removing price as a signal in higher education markets may skew
students’ college-going decisions, resulting in increased “overmatching” (see
Arcidiacono et al., 2016, for example).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2.2 discusses existing literature regarding
merit-aid and college completion, and introduces the NMLLS; Section 2.3 presents a
theoretical model of college persistence; Section 2.4 describes the data; Section 2.5
summarizes the empirical approach; Section 2.6 discusses main findings and robustness
checks; Section 2.7 discusses other explanations for patterns we find in the results; and
Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Financial aid and student outcomes
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The natural experiment of lottery-financed merit-based aid programs provides a
promising avenue for determining the relationship between aid and college completion.
Analyzing statewide educational attainment data, Sjoquist and Winters (2012, 2015b)
found no difference in college attainment for those exposed to lottery scholarship
programs. Using a similar methodology, Jia (2017) found that program features matter:
lower initial scholarship eligibility requirements increased two-year degree attainment,
and funding generosity increased the completion of a bachelor’s degree.
Scott-Clayton (2011) found completion effects of 9.4 percentage points (59
percent) for students just above an ACT cut-off for West Virginia’s lottery-funded
PROMISE scholarship program, compared to students just below. Using similar
strategies, Bruce and Carruthers (2014) and Welch (2014) found no program effect for
Tennessee’s lottery scholarship. The discrepancy between these studies may arise from
differences in student characteristics. Because of differences in program requirements,
all students in Scott-Clayton’s sample have high school GPAs of 3.0 or higher while
students in Bruce and Carruthers’ and Welch’s sample have high school GPAs below
3.0.6 It may be that only stronger students are able to respond to merit requirements. A
high rate of scholarship loss supports this supposition. For example, only 50 percent of
students who initially earn the PROMISE scholarship retain it for four years of college.
It also bears noting that Scott-Clayton’s large 9.4 percentage point (59 percent) point
completion effect at four years declines to 4.5 percentage points (12 percent) at five
years. It is therefore possible that the scholarship program improves time to degree
without changing eventual college completion. This would explain why Sjoquist and
Winters (2012, 2015b) find no population graduation effect.
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Castleman and Long (2013) examine the effect of the need-based Florida Student
Access Grant (FSAG), which awards $1,300 annual grants to students whose family’s EFC
falls below an annually determined cutoff, with no additional academic restrictions for grant
receipt in the first year. Because the EFC is generated from information provided by students
to the FAFSA according to an opaque algorithm, and because the cutoff is determined each
year and is not publicized,7 it is unlikely that students manipulated their FAFSA responses to
become eligible. Students just above and just below this cutoff were therefore likely to have
differed only by grant receipt, providing an opportunity to test the effect of need-based
financial aid on college outcomes. Castleman and Long find that students just below the
cutoff for the FSAG in the 2000-2001 school year are 4.6 percentage points (22 percent)
more likely to earn a bachelor’s degree in six years than those just above the cutoff. In this
case, the effect on graduation persists over time: it is 3.2 percentage points (20 percent) at
five years and 5.2 percentage points (21 percent) at seven years, the longest period reported.
At least one study implicates financial aid in worse college outcomes. In their study
of Massachusetts’ Adams Scholarship, a program providing 10th graders in the top quartile of
a state standardized test with tuition waivers to attend public in-state colleges, Cohodes and
Goodman (2014) find that award eligibility decreases the likelihood of obtaining a degree
within six years by 2.5 percentage points (4 percent). The mechanism for this perverse
outcome appears to be the diversion of students from higher quality private to lower quality
public institutions. The authors conclude that students are willing to sacrifice significant
college quality in response to scholarship receipt.
Mixed evidence for lottery program effects may be a result of their broad base in
terms of income (so that many recipients are not financially constrained) and relatively
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narrow base in terms of merit (so that many recipients are likely to succeed in college
anyway). We are therefore particularly interested in the effect of NMLLS on lower income
and higher ability students, the group that saw the greatest benefit from the FSAG program.
2.2.1 NMLLS program details
The NMLLS, established by the New Mexico Legislature in 1996, first became
available to students in fall 1997. New Mexico residents qualify for the NMLLS if they
earn a high school diploma or general educational development (GED) equivalency in
New Mexico and enroll at a public postsecondary institution in the first regular fall or
spring semester following high school graduation. Most state lottery scholarship
programs reward high school achievement and begin with the first semester of college
enrollment. In New Mexico, however, students become eligible for full tuition at any of
the 16 qualified public two- or four-year colleges after they complete a full-time course
load (at least 12 credits) with a 2.5 GPA or higher in their first college semester. To
encourage students to try for the scholarship, New Mexico colleges offer students
“Bridge to Success” scholarships which completely or mostly offset tuition in their first
semester. In the period examined, students could receive the award for up to eight
semesters, provided they enroll full-time, continuously, and maintained a cumulative 2.5
GPA. Only 58 percent of first semester students over 1994-1999 met NMLLS
requirements, and only 30 percent remained eligible at the end of their second year.
Before the NMLLS, New Mexico nearly exclusively awarded financial aid based
on need. According to a 1994 National Association of State Student Grant & Aid
Programs report, New Mexico devoted an average of $222 per full-time equivalent (FTE)
undergraduate student in financial aid in the 1993-1994 academic year. Of the $222 total
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per FTE, only $3 (1.4 percent) was merit-based. By contrast, in 2000, New Mexico
allocated $687 per undergraduate FTE, with $368 (54 percent) being merit-based. It
appears the NMLLS not only supplemented rather than supplanted student aid, but
drastically changed the student aid landscape throughout the state.
Compared to states with similar programs, NMLLS eligibility requirements are
relatively “low-bar.” For example, Georgia’s HOPE scholarship requires students to
graduate high school with a 3.0 cumulative GPA and maintain a 3.0 GPA in college. 8
Eligibility for Tennessee’s HOPE scholarship requires minimum ACT/SAT scores in
addition to the 3.0 high school GPA requirement. Renewal requires a 2.75 minimum
overall GPA after attempting 24 and 48 credit hours, and requires a 3.0 minimum overall
GPA at 72- and 96-credit hour reviews. 9 Florida’s Bright Futures Scholarship has three
levels of merit-based awards, each with varying high school GPA, standardized test
scores, and community service requirements.10
If financial constraints are binding for students, then the NMLLS should have the
desired effect of increasing the proportion of students meeting the 2.5 cumulative GPA
and 12 credit hours continuous enrollment requirements, thus increasing completion
rates. But if other constraints, such as academic preparation are also binding, the
scholarship could have the opposite effect, reducing completion rates for marginal
students induced to enroll at the state’s flagship university who otherwise would have
enrolled at a less prestigious university, a two-year program at a community college, or
perhaps not have enrolled in college at all. With price signals in the market for higher
education removed, some students may choose to embark on a more prestigious, yet
riskier, academic path—one that maximizes the “worth” of the scholarship (i.e., that
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which covers the largest cost). Consider full-time tuition at all 16 participating public
institutions in New Mexico as depicted in Table 2.1. A student better matched at Santa
Fe Community College may decide to attend UNM instead simply because the
scholarship covers more costs, the degree carries more prestige, and thus the NMLLS is
“worth” more at the state’s flagship university.
2.3 Merit aid and college persistence
We model students’ college persistence behavior (and ultimately their decision to
graduate) using a multistage investment model adapted from Bettinger (2004). Students
decide to enroll in college if they perceive in the initial period that the discounted stream
of future benefits exceeds the expected discounted value of college costs. Benefits are
based on the earnings differential between those with college and high school degrees,
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student’s discount factor, r is the discount rate, and students expect to work for 𝑇 ∗ years
following graduation. TTD is the expected number of years it takes to earn a degree,
with students beginning work in the following period. College graduates earn wcoll and
high school graduates earn whs. The cost of college is:
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where Ts,it is the fraction of time student i dedicates to studying or attending class of the
total time available for working or studying in time t; this fraction, multiplied by the high
school graduate’s earnings, represents the opportunity cost of attending college. Ft is
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tuition and fees in time t, where the parameter 𝛾 is the proportion of tuition and fees the
student is responsible for, as college attendance is commonly covered by one’s parents.
Ait is non-loan financial aid available to student i in time t. At least some of the available
aid is merit-based, and so Ait is increasing in student effort per quality credit (credit times
the four point GPA) earned, eit , which in turn is increasing in academic skill acquired in
the previous period, ai, t-1 , and the time dedicated to studying, Ts,it .
Before enrolling, the student has some idea of how to divide time between
studying and work, as well as how much effort is needed to maintain the offered financial
aid package. Upon enrolling, students expect the benefits of earning a degree outweigh
the costs. Once enrolled, however, they may discover they overestimated their academic
preparation, underestimated the effort required to earn college credits, or both. As a
result, more time devoted to school may be needed, which raises opportunity cost, or may
result in lower grades than expected, thereby resulting in higher direct costs because
merit aid is rescinded. In either scenario, costs have risen, and are now more likely to
exceed the benefits of continuing in college.
The model predicts countervailing effects of broadly available merit aid on degree
receipt. Because the scholarship reduces the cost of attendance, more students will attend
and complete college. Simultaneously, students who are induced to attend college due to
lower cost may overestimate their ability and underestimate the effort required to earn the
NMLLS, so may be more likely to drop out. Academic preparation is central to
understanding how students respond to such financial aid. As the NMLLS effectively
removes price signals across public in-state institutions, students may seek to maximize
the value of the scholarship by pursuing a degree from an institution which they feel
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carries the most value—typically a more expensive or reputable institution. This may
result in some students overmatching (e.g., attending a school for which they are
academically underprepared), leading to higher attrition rates for these students.
To provide an incentive to graduate in a timely manner, the NMLLS was
available to students for only eight semesters following the bridging semester. However,
the scholarship also only required a 12 credit-hour load for a student to be considered
full-time. Thus the incentive to graduate in nine semesters was countered by the
incentive to maintain a 2.5 GPA, which would be harder to do with a higher credit load.
Students thus face a tradeoff between losing the scholarship if they fail to meet the
renewal requirements, and facing higher direct and opportunity costs at the end of their
programs if they take longer than nine semesters to graduate. If the opportunity cost,
including the risk of losing the scholarship, of a 15 credit per semester course load that
would produce a degree in nine semesters exceeds the cost of the 20 or so credits not
covered by the scholarship, and the added opportunity cost of delayed full-time work,
then the program may not effectively encourage timely completion. Students whose
families are funding their college education may not respond to the semester cap.
2.4 Data set
We use administrative data for all first-time, full-time entering freshmen at UNM
before and after the implementation of the NMLLS to estimate completion effects. UNM
enrolls over 20,000 students each year in the City of Albuquerque, the largest
metropolitan area of the state with over 500,000 residents. UNM is nearly an openenrollment institution. Our data include socio-demographic information (age, race,
ethnicity, gender, family income, declined to state race-ethnicity), high school academic
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performance (high school GPA, standardized test scores, indication of remedial
coursework at UNM), and college academic performance by semester (credits earned,
college GPA, date of graduation). Data are complete with the exception of family
income and high school GPA. We only have family income for FAFSA-filing students,
constituting 51 percent of students. For those that did not submit a FAFSA, we assume
that their family income is sufficiently high (i.e., ≥ $40,000) as to not qualify for the
Federal Pell Grant Program. This assumption is supported by the 1995-1996 Federal Pell
Grant End-of-Year Report showing that less than two percent of Pell recipients had
family income in excess of $40,000.11 This assumption is not perfect. King (2004)
estimates that in 2000 over ten percent of all Pell-eligible students did not fill out a
FAFSA.12 If the analysis in King (2004) holds for our data set, then we would incur
systematic measurement bias in the family income variable—some lower income
students would be incorrectly placed in the higher income category. Because we find
evidence that low-income students drive the completion effects we detect, measurement
error would likely only serve to dampen point estimates for low-income regressions. We
are missing high school GPA for home-schooled students, a small portion of
matriculating students at UNM. For these students, we assigned them the mean high
school GPA of 3.28.
We concentrate on the years 1994 to 1999, bounding the policy change by three
years before and after implementation. These years encompass the largest economic
expansion in the U.S. since World War II. During this period labor market conditions in
New Mexico were gradually tightening but remained relatively stable, so we need not
worry much that broad economic conditions are driving the results. To our knowledge,
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there were no concurrent policy changes at the high school or postsecondary level in New
Mexico over the 1994-1999 period which would have differentially impacted enrollment
and/or completion for residents and nonresidents. As discussed below, having an equal
number of years before and after the lottery scholarship is advantageous given our
identification strategy. As we show in Section 6, results are similar when we expand the
sample period to include additional student cohorts.
In our preferred specification, we compare recent high school graduates from
New Mexico (who are NMLLS eligible) with those from out of state (who are not
eligible, but who experience the same campus environment), while excluding foreign
students.
Table 2.2 compares summary statistics for resident and nonresident students
before and after the implementation of the NMLLS. It appears the composition of these
groups changed across pre- and post-treatment periods. In years before the
implementation of the NMLLS, resident students had higher high school GPAs and ACT
composite scores compared to years following the implementation of the NMLLS.
Moreover, students matriculating after implementation were more likely to take remedial
coursework at UNM. These changes are statistically significant, suggesting that the
NMLLS may have induced students with weaker academic preparation to enroll at UNM.
Table 2.2 also shows that residents were less likely to come from lower-income families
following implementation of the NMLLS, another indication of a compositional effect.
The academic achievement of nonresident students improved following implementation
of the NMLLS, according to HSGPA and composite ACT scores.
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Although several statistically significant differences exist between resident and
nonresident students in terms of high school GPA, composite ACT scores, remedial
coursework, family income, race, and ethnicity, this does not threaten the validity of our
difference-in-differences model of completion if the common trends assumption holds.
The identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences model is that pre-treatment
trends in the outcome variable be similar in trajectory across the treatment and control
groups. As a visual check of this identifying assumption, Figure 2.1 presents pretreatment trends in graduation rates for residents and nonresidents between 1994 and
1999. We are particularly interested in six-year graduation rate trends, a standard
measure of completion.13 Visual inspection supports the validity of a difference-indifferences identification strategy examining six-year graduation rates. A more rigorous
method of testing the common trends assumption is presented in Autor (2003).
Following this strategy, we specify a flexible difference-in-differences model by
interacting the resident dummy variable with cohort dummy variables, producing a model
allowing for treatment at different time periods. This model can be expressed as
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑒 ) = 𝛾 + 𝜆 + ∑

𝛽 𝐷 (𝑡 = 𝑘 + 𝑗) + 𝑋 𝛿 + 𝜀

(3)

where i denotes the student, s denotes residency status, and t denotes cohort year. The
variable Dst is the binary treatment indicator and k is the year which the treatment started
(k = 1997 in our case). Xist contains controls for race, ethnicity, gender, family income,
remedial coursework in college, high school GPA, and standardized test scores. Models
report robust standard errors. In equation (3), m and q are the number of leads and lags of
the treatment effect included. We include two leads and three lags in our test, defining
1994 as the reference cohort.
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Testing the common trends assumption using (3) requires examining whether
𝛽 = 0 ∀𝑗 < 0.

(4)

In other words, the common trends assumption holds when the coefficients on all
leads of the treatment are zero. This specification also has the advantage of informing
whether estimated treatment effects occur in multiple post-treatment time periods, fade
away with time, or remain constant, for example. Tests are conducted for the four
graduation outcomes using ordinary least squares and results are presented in Tables 2.3
through 2.6. Results provide evidence that the common trends assumption holds for all
of our specifications, as estimated coefficients on all leads are not statistically different
from zero.
Our data include 10,022 resident students, 6,307 of which enrolled during the
post-NMLLS period and were eligible for the Bridge to Success Scholarship. Of these,
2,664 met cumulative GPA and credit attainment requirements to begin the NMLLS in
their second semester. Table 2.7 documents the number of students that maintain the
scholarship in the second through ninth semester. It is apparent scholarship loss was
quite common. Of the 2,664 students that qualified for the NMLLS, approximately 30
percent were still eligible for the NMLLS going into their third year.
2.5 Empirical model
We conduct difference-in-differences matching estimation on the propensity score
to mitigate any observable differences between resident and nonresident students.
Chabé-Ferret (2015) conducts Monte Carlo simulations using experimental job training
program data from LaLonde (1986), finding that difference-in-differences matching is
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superior to simple difference-in-differences estimation (i.e., no matching) in replicating
experimental results when the model is symmetric (i.e., there are an equal number of preand post-treatment periods) and matching is performed on time-invariant characteristics,
two conditions our model satisfies. Our approach uses kernel matching, a one-to-many
matching technique that assigns larger weights to control units closer in propensity score.
The general form of the matching estimator is given by
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where n1t, n1t’ are the number of treated cases before and after the inception of the
NMLLS, Sp is the common support region, and I0t, I0t’, I1t, I1t’ are the resident and
nonresident groups before and after the NMLLS. Graduation rates for resident and
nonresident students are given by Y1t, Y0t, Y1t’, Y0t’. The function w(i, j) denotes the
weight given to j𝑡ℎ case, where ∑ 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 and 0 < 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) < 1. The weighting
function w(i, j) is given by
𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) =
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where K is the Epanechnikov kernel function and 𝑙 (⋅) ≡ ln
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is the fitted linearized

propensity score from a logistic regression model estimated by maximum likelihood. We
use linearized propensity scores as they are more likely to have a distribution that is
approximately normal. Treatment effects, ∆

, are calculated using kernel-weighted

least squares according to equation (6). Robust standard errors are reported. The
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propensity score model includes all covariates in levels, as well as several quadratic
terms.14 Results of the propensity score model are presented in Table 2.8. It is important
to note that while the propensity score model may seem awkward in that it predicts the
immutable condition of being a New Mexico resident, it is not essential that the
propensity score model have a meaningful interpretation. Instead, the validity of the
propensity score model rests on how well it balances covariates across treatment and
control groups (Imbens and Rubin, 2015; Imbens, 2015).
Having a small group of nonresident students relative to resident students has
implications for our estimates. In order to increase the precision of our estimated
treatment effects, and to avoid imposing functional form where possible, we choose to
conduct kernel density matching. 15 This method has the advantage of lower variance
since more information is used. On the other hand, it may result in an increase in bias
due to the potential for considering “bad” matches. Although the further the observations
are in terms of propensity score, the less weight is given to the potential bad match, this
makes adequate overlap a necessary condition for the validity of this method.
In our analysis, we limit matching to those individuals whose propensity scores
lie in the common support region, which is over 99.5 percent of the original sample. We
do not trim observations from the analysis. As a sensitivity analysis, we estimate effects
using various fixed bandwidths, h, for the kernel function. Importantly, the choice of
bandwidth also involves a bias-variance trade-off. Smaller bandwidths consider a smaller
portion of the pool of control observations, and thus use less information, which tends to
reduce bias (from being less likely to consider poor matches) while increasing sampling
variance. In order to assess the effectiveness of the matching procedure, several tests are
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conducted following Imbens and Rubin (2015), although they are modified for
difference-in-differences matching with repeated cross sections. An explanation of these
tests and their results are presented in Appendix 2.A.
A power analysis in Table 2.9 shows that most models we estimate have sufficient
power to detect a five percent change in completion rates at the five percent significancelevel. Models limiting the sample to students from low-income families are substantially
underpowered, however. The reader should thus exercise caution in interpreting results
when the sample is limited in this way. Models limited to less academically prepared
students also fail to meet the accepted standard of 80 percent power. Underpowered
regressions are less likely to detect meaningful program effects, even if they do actually
exist. Evidence of low power is seen in results for students from low-income families—
there exist several coefficients large in magnitude that do not achieve statistical
significance. Although meaningful completion effects may exist in these cases, all we
can conclude is that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient is not
statistically different from zero.
In addition to estimating the overall effect of the NMLLS, we are also interested
in whether program effects differ depending on academic preparation. We explore this
possibility by estimating separate models on students above and below the mean high
school GPA.16 We disaggregate further by family income in order to examine program
effects for students whose financial constraints are more likely binding. Robustness
checks using varying cohorts and smoothing parameters are discussed in Section 2.6.
Additionally, we estimate models of cumulative credits earned and time to degree to
examine whether apparent completion effects are driven by changes in student course-
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taking behavior. Lastly, we explore regression discontinuity design in estimating
completion effects of the NMLLS.
We note that while difference-in-differences models hinge on the comparability of
pre-treatment trends in outcomes across residents and nonresidents, combining
difference-in-differences methods with propensity score matching controls for
compositional changes in groups over time (Stuart et al. 2014). It is also worth noting
that regressions control for high school achievement and standardized test scores, the
main indication of compositional change. Also, because UNM is a de facto open
enrollment institution, changes in selectivity are not likely to confound the analysis
(Binder and Ganderton, 2004). We agree that compositional change occurred, but this
does not threaten the validity of the treatment effects we find.
2.6 Results
Means and normalized differences after kernel matching are presented in Table
2.10. Comparing means before and after the NMLLS, it appears that the matching
algorithm performed well in balancing covariates. Normalized differences for pre- and
post-NMLLS periods are near zero, with the largest normalized difference (-.122) far
below one-quarter of a standard deviation unit in absolute value. We produce these
statistics by academic preparation as well, finding a similar pattern, although differences
were slightly higher when considering students more than one standard deviation above
the mean high school GPA. Overall, normalized differences suggest excellent balance in
covariates following kernel matching.
Table 2.11 presents results of the difference-in-differences kernel matching
estimation. Note that we find little evidence of an overall program effect. Point
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estimates are near zero and do not approach statistical significance. These estimates,
however, mask large program responses that appear when we divide the sample by
academic preparation. Considering students with below average high school GPA, we
find a negative completion effect for six-year graduation of 8.7 percentage points (27.5
percent). Students with above average high school GPA are 9.4 percentage points (16.8
percent) more likely to graduate within six years compared to similar nonresident
students. Effects are significant at the five and ten percent-levels, respectively. Thus,
while we are certain of a negative completion effect for less academically prepared
recipients, we remain cautious in concluding a significant positive completion effect for
more academically prepared recipients. The NMLLS did not have a meaningful impact
on the likelihood of graduating within six years for the most academically prepared
students.
Table 2.12 presents results of the matching estimation performed on low-income
students, defined as coming from households with less than $40,000 in annual income.
We again find little evidence of completion effects in the aggregate, but see meaningful
effects when disaggregating by student ability. For low-income, low-achieving students,
we estimate a large decrease in completion within six years. For low-income, higherachieving students, we find a large increase in completion within six years significant at
the ten percent-level. As shown in Table 2.13, we find no significant completion effects
for students from higher-income households. It appears that our results at higher levels of
aggregation may be driven by students from families where financial constraints are
binding.
2.6.1 Alternative bandwidths, cohorts, and control groups
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We test results for sensitivity to the choice of the smoothing parameter, or
bandwidth, in our kernel matching algorithm. Specifically, we estimate models using
bandwidths h = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3} with the sample stratified by academic preparedness and
family income, as in our main results. These results are presented in Appendix 2.B.
Table 2.B1 presents results for our estimates by graduation semester and academic
preparation. In Table 2.B1, larger bandwidths result in larger effect sizes and smaller
standard errors. Overall we find a similar pattern relative to our preferred specification.
That is, we find no evidence of completion effects in the aggregate, but find a positive
relationship between academic preparation and degree completion. Tables 2.B2 and 2.B3
also broadly agree with the results of our preferred specification: significant program
effects are confined to those from families with lower incomes; the same divergent
effects are detected, but effect sizes are significantly larger in absolute value. Appendix
2.C presents results using different sets of freshmen cohorts. Although a bit noisier than
robustness checks using alternative bandwidths, we see a similar pattern of completion
rates emerge as compared to our preferred specification.17
We also estimate simple pre-post models of completion using qualified UNM
resident students before the implementation of the NMLLS as the control group.
Estimates are produced via logistic regression, where the coefficient of interest is on a
dummy variable equal to one in years when the NMLLS was in place, and zero
otherwise. We assume model errors are independent across cohorts, yet correlated within
cohorts, thus standard errors are clustered at the cohort level. Because these models do
not account for any trends over time, they are limited in this respect. However, these
models do not rely on nonresident students as the control group and thus provide insight
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into whether estimated program effects are some sort of artifact of the data. Results of
simple pre-post models reveal a significant 1.6 percentage point (3.6 percent) decline in
completion rates overall, with a 3.3 percentage point (10.4 percent) decline for low
achieving high school students. This offers evidence that the negative completion effects
we estimate for some NMLLS recipients in preferred specifications are not due to model
misspecification.
2.6.2 Regression discontinuity design approach
We explore exploiting eligibility requirements of the NMLLS to estimate whether
the program had any meaningful effect on degree completion at UNM. Recall that a
student is eligible for the NMLLS if they are a New Mexico resident, have lived in the
state for at least one year, graduated from high school or earned their GED in New
Mexico, immediately enroll in a qualified public institution by the next fall semester, and
meet credit hour and college GPA requirements during the bridging semester. The
NMLLS requires that students complete at least 12 credit hours during the bridging
semester with a minimum 2.5 GPA. Accordingly, we limit the sample to all students
which meet the NMLLS eligibility requirements with the exception of the bridging
semester GPA requirement, and compare students just above the 2.5 threshold to students
just below. We find the regression discontinuity approach appealing because it is simple,
objective, and requires little information. It is also relatively straightforward to verify
with visual checks, easy to interpret estimates, and easy to perform falsification tests. In
sum, in many ways it is a cleaner approach than difference-in-differences matching
estimation.
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Because participation in the NMLLS is not strictly a deterministic function of
college GPA (i.e., other funding sources such as academic or athletic scholarships are
prioritized above NMLLS funds, for example), we appeal to a fuzzy regression
discontinuity (FRD) approach using a sample of resident students from 1997 - 2008.
FRD only requires that there is a significant jump in the probability of treatment
assignment above the cutoff of the running variable, bridging semester GPA in our case.
We visually inspect the jump in the probability of NMLLS funding by bridging semester
GPA in Figure 2.2. The jump between the quadratic fitted lines below and above the
threshold is below one (approximately 80 percent), so FRD seems appropriate in our
context.
However, we fail to pass a critical identification test for regression discontinuity
studies: cutoff manipulation. Figure 2.3 plots the density of the running variable, here the
bridging semester GPA. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are shown in gray. As
is evident, there is a statistically significant discontinuity in the density of the running
variable around the NMLLS eligibility cutoff. It appears some students manipulate this
eligibility cutoff by perhaps taking easier courses or dropping courses when a poor grade
is expected. Since regression discontinuity may be thought of as random assignment in
the neighborhood of the cutoff, this provides evidence of students nonrandomly selecting
into treatment and control groups. Table 2.14 presents results of formal manipulation
tests using local polynomial density estimators following McCrary (2008) and Cattaneo
et al. (2017). The null hypothesis of these tests is continuity in the density of the running
variable around the bridging semester GPA cutoff. We strongly reject the null hypothesis
of density continuity around the GPA cutoff under varying assumptions.
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2.7 Other possible explanations for the patterns we find
2.7.1 Program anticipation
If there were anticipatory effects of the NMLLS, this would violate identifying
assumptions of the difference-in-differences estimator and would lead to biased results.
The passage of the lottery scholarship occurred in March 1996 and the policy was
instituted approximately 17 months later, giving New Mexico students and families two
semesters to anticipate the policy change and modify their behavior. This could have
resulted in some students taking easier high school course loads to ensure high school
graduation and ultimately NMLLS eligibility. Such students would be less prepared for
higher education than their peers but would still be NMLLS-eligible. This narrative is
consistent with the proposal that the NMLLS incentivized marginal students to enroll at
UNM who may have otherwise not enrolled in college or attended a two-year college
instead.
Considering whether out-of-state families acted on the anticipated policy, the time
between passage and implementation likely did not afford a long enough window to
move to New Mexico and establish program eligibility (at least for the inaugural year)
due to 1) the requirement of living in New Mexico for at least one year and 2) the high
costs associated with moving to another state, especially with a student currently
attending a high school outside of New Mexico. In either case, we do not detect any
indication of anticipatory effects evidenced by results from flexible difference-indifferences models in Tables 2.3 to 2.6.
2.7.2 Confounding factors
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A massive increase in enrollment at UNM accompanied the NMLLS (3,715 to
6,307 resident students). One possible confounding factor is an increase in wealth.
Lovenheim and Reynolds (2013) show that greater housing wealth both increases the
likelihood of enrollment at public flagship universities relative to non-flagship schools
and directly increases the likelihood of college completion. The authors find that a
$10,000 increase in real housing wealth increases the relative likelihood of attending a
flagship university by two percent and the overall completion likelihood by 1.8 percent.
Simple accounting reveals this is not likely a significant driver of our results. Over the
study period real housing prices in New Mexico increased by a scant 0.5 percent. 18 If we
assume a (very) conservative median home price of $215,000 in 1994, this only translates
into approximate 0.2 percent increases in both relative flagship enrollment and overall
college completion likelihood.19 Moreover, real personal income only increased by 5.5
percent over the same period, an annualized growth rate less than one percent per year, so
it is unlikely that any broad increase in overall wealth drove increases in resident
enrollment after the launch of the NMLLS. 20 We also consider labor market conditions
as a potential confounding factor. As we mention above, because our sample period
spans the longest continuous period of economic growth in the United States since
WWII, broad economic conditions are unlikely to be driving the enrollment effect of the
NMLLS.
2.7.3 Congestion
Another possible explanation for the patterns we see are capacity constraints and
congestion at UNM. This would explain what we see in Table 2.2—where the academic
preparation and standardized test scores of nonresidents increase by a statistically
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significant amount after program implementation. If the large increase in NMLLSqualified students forced the university to admit fewer nonresidents and be more selective
in their criteria, then we would expect higher “quality” nonresident cohorts post-NMLLS.
This would result in model results being biased downwards. However, according to
university officials, in 1996, the year prior to the implementation of the NMLLS, the
university was at approximately 50 percent capacity. Accordingly, they did not
experience any “bottlenecks” in terms of class size, advising capacity, waitlists for
classes, et cetera, after the lottery scholarship launched. 21 If there was congestion at
UNM post-NMLLS, this would likely increase students’ time to degree, which we find
no evidence to support.
Another point which merits mention is the funding mechanism under which New
Mexico public institutions of higher education operate. New Mexico universities are
funded using an enrollment formula. That is, the more students enrolled, the more state
dollars are allocated to the institution. This provides an incentive for institutions to
compete with one another on the basis on enrollment. There is no de jure limit on the
number of additional students UNM may enroll in a given semester, so it is likely the
university simply absorbed this additional enrollment without crowding out other groups,
such as nonresidents and low-income students.
2.7.4 Student course-taking behavior
Because the incentive to graduate in nine semesters is countered by the incentive
to maintain a 2.5 GPA under the NMLLS, we are concerned that students may have
responded to the NMLLS by altering their course-taking behavior. Specifically, one
might expect the NMLLS to incentivize students to take fewer credits in order to increase
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their likelihood of continued eligibility. If this is the case, then estimates may reflect a
lengthening of time to degree, not necessarily lower completion rates on behalf of less
academically prepared students. Due to this concern, we construct difference-indifferences matching estimates of cumulative credits earned since enrollment. These
estimates are presented in Appendix 2.D.
Estimates in Appendix 2.D present the effects of the NMLLS on cumulative
credits earned using the same matching procedure as models of college completion.
Table 2.D1 provides no evidence of a change in credits attempted overall. Significant
positive course-taking effects are detected for academically well prepared students.
Notably, while effects display the expected negative sign for less academically prepared
students at UNM, they are not statistically different from zero. We find evidence that the
NMLLS incentivized better prepared students to take more credits, where effects range
from approximately 2 percentage points (7 percent) after the first year to 15 percentage
points (15 percent) at the six-year mark. We find that these effects are largely driven by
students from low-income families. These results refute the notion that the NMLLS
resulted in marginally prepared students completing degrees at a slower pace. We also
directly test this hypothesis by estimating difference-in-differences matching estimates
using semesters to graduation as the outcome. We find no evidence of any change in
time to degree associated with the NMLLS program.
2.8. Conclusions
We examine the effect of an exceptionally generous and low-bar merit-based
scholarship on college completion. We estimate variants of the difference-in-differences
model using qualified resident students as the treatment group and a matched sample of
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ineligible nonresident students as the control group. The common trends assumption is
supported both visually and empirically. The sample is stratified by academic
preparation and family income to see which, if any, subgroups are driving completion
effects. We conduct kernel matching and examine its success through rigorous testing.
A flexible difference-in-differences model is estimated to verify that program effects are
limited to treatment years. Sensitivity to cohorts included as well as the smoothing
parameter used in the matching alogirthm are reported. We also estimate models of
credit accumulation and time to degree completion, in addition to exploring the validity
of a regression discontinuity approach in estimating completion effects of the NMLLS.
Our analysis reveals a divergent effect of the NMLLS: more academically
prepared high school students are more likely to graduate in six years compared to their
nonresident counterparts, while the opposite is true for less academically prepared
recipients of the NMLLS. These countervailing results mask completion effects of the
NMLLS in the aggregate. We find positive completion effects for those with above
average high school GPA similar in magnitude to those in the literature, and negative
effects for lower achieving scholarship recipients, consistent with discouragement from
raising expectations for marginal students that otherwise would not have attended
college, or at least a four-year college.
Results suggest that low-income, high achieving high school students benefit
from the NMLLS, while lower-achieving students do not. The latter may be explained by
overmatching at UNM, where marginally prepared students that would have otherwise
chosen to pursue an easier course of study at another institution, or not attend college at
all, attend the state’s flagship university because the scholarship renders it more
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affordable. Discouragement may also play a role. Students that lose the scholarship may
expect higher costs and a lower likelihood of completion, and so may be more likely to
drop out than nonresidents with similar academic performance.
The main conclusion that we draw from our analysis is that setting the bar too low
in terms of merit aid may be detrimental to the success of the least academically prepared
students. The promise of generous financial aid tied to seemingly modest academic
criteria may actually worsen college persistence for students with weaker academic
preparation. When price signals in the market for higher education are removed, as is the
case with the NMLLS, many students may choose to attend institutions for which they
are a poor match (i.e., are less academically prepared than their peers).
Since its inception in 1997, the NMLLS has seen significant changes. Starting in
the 2014-2015 academic year, the scholarship was capped at seven semesters (plus the
initial bridging semester) and initial and renewal credit requirements were increased from
12 to 15 credits earned per semester. A statewide budget crisis in 2017 resulted in the
legislature making major cuts to the NMLLS—whereas the scholarship paid 100 percent
of tuition over our study period, the program only covers approximately 60 percent of
tuition as of the 2017-2018 academic year. The 2017 Regular Session saw the passage of
SB 420, which allows students to take a “gap” year after high school and still remain
eligible for the NMLLS. It is not clear how recent program changes will affect student
course-taking and persistence at UNM. A decline in scholarship generosity will reduce
access to higher education in New Mexico, but may be necessary given the constant
financial pressure the Lottery Scholarship Fund faces. Raising the bar in terms of initial
eligibility and renewal requirements sends a signal to high school students that they are
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expected to work harder than before, which may result in more efficient spending (i.e.,
less funding of marginally prepared students that ultimately drop out) and shorter time to
degree. Allowing for a “gap” year is sure to increase program costs for an already
financially troubled program.
Considering the poor financial health of the NMLLS, it may be time to narrow the
program and prioritize funding for certain students. Our results suggest that completion
effects may be driven by low-income families. Adding a family-income cap or some
other type of need-based component would reduce overall program costs and target
spending towards those that seem most responsive to the NMLLS. A need-based
component would also make the NMLLS more politically tenable, as it is often slated as
a major regressive tax in New Mexico.
In general, further research is needed to investigate how to increase degree
completion, not merely enrollment, while avoiding harming less academically prepared
students. One potential remedy may be to pair lottery scholarship funds with stronger
academic supports such as additional mandatory advising, mid-semester check-ups, or an
additional one-credit mandatory course on topics such as scholarship details and
strategies for academically suriving the freshmen year. Another potentially promising
reform would be to tie program eligibility to high school performance rather than college
performance. Having intitial and renewal requirements tied to college performance
provides incentives for undesired student behaviors, such as padding GPAs with easier
coursework or taking fewer credits so as to increase the likelihood of continued
scholarship eligibility.
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Our results inform recent proposals to make college free for a large proportion of
students, whether at the state- or national-level. Our findings suggest that such proposals,
which effectively remove price differentials between public colleges, may distort
students’ college choice decisions. In order to maximize the value of such scholarships,
students may increasingly overmatch by choosing more prestigious public colleges for
which they are underprepared.
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Note: The plots above show the likelihood of degree completion for incoming
cohorts over the period 1994 to 1999. Solid lines represent resident students while
dashed lines represent nonresident students. The vertical bars at 1997 mark the
implementation of the New Mexico Legislative Lottery Scholarship.
Figure 2.1 Pre-post trends in the probability of graduating, by residency
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Note: Points depict the within-bin sample average of NMLLS receipt probability by
bridging semester GPA. A quadratic fit has been added below and above the cutoff
at 2.5. The number of bins is calculated using the mimicking-variance evenly
spaced method using spacing estimators. The uniform kernel is used to construct the
global polynomial estimators. The plot provides visual evidence of the
appropriateness of a fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) approach.
Figure 2.2 Jump in treatment probability around the bridging semester GPA cutoff
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Note: Figure 2.3 presents the density of the running variable (bridging semester
GPA) around the NMLLS eligibility cutoff with 95 percent confidence intervals in
shown in gray. This plot was constructed using a local cubic approximation. The
uniform kernel is used to construct the global polynomial estimators. The plot
reveals a statistically significant discontinuity in the running variable density around
the eligibility cutoff.
Figure 2.3 Bridging semester density around the bridging semester GPA cutoff
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Table 2.1 Full-time resident tuition at all NMLLS-eligible institutions

Institution
New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology
University of New Mexico
New Mexico State University
Western New Mexico University
Eastern New Mexico University
New Mexico Highlands University
New Mexico Military Institute
Northern New Mexico College
Mesalands Community College
San Juan College
Central New Mexico Community College
Clovis Community College
Santa Fe Community College
New Mexico Junior College
Luna Community College
Southwestern Indian Polytechnic Institute

Program Length
(years)
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Tuition
and Fees
7,000
6,950
6,729
6,644
5,630
5,550
5,179
5,112
1,990
1,773
1,340
1,324
1,196
1,158
968
730

Source: Institution financial aid department websites. Accessed 28 March 2017.
Figures present tuition and fees for one academic year taking fifteen credit hours per
semester. For two-year schools it is assumed the student is within the community
college district, where applicable.

42

Table 2.2 Student characteristics before and after initiation of the NMLLS program
Residents
Variable

Before

After Diff.

Nonresidents
Before

After Diff.

Grad. in 4 Yrs

.114

.103 -.011*

.153

.154 .001

Grad. in 4.5 Yrs

.195

.189 -.006

.210

.211 .002

Grad. in 5 Yrs

.345

.332 -.013

.290

.297 .008

Grad.in 6 Yrs

.447

.420 -.027***

.334

.319 -.015

3.312
(.502)

3.273 -.038***
(.471)

3.233
(.532)

3.300 .067**
(.503)

22.530
(3.834)

22.176 -.354***
(3.887)

22.317
(4.109)

22.861 .544**
(4.096)

HSGPA

ACT

Remedial

.264

.290 .026***

.164

.227 .063***

Income < $40K

.230

.205 -.025***

.155

.162 .007

Female

.571

.565 -.006

.526

.545 .019

Hispanic

.386

.375 -.011

.147

.166 .020

Native

.043

.045 .002

.041

.051 .010

Asian

.047

.037 -.010**

.034

.026 -.008

Black

.021

.022 .002

.082

.080 -.002

587

649

Observations

3,715

6,307

Source: Freshmen Tracking System, Office of Institutional Analytics, UNM. ***, **,
and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent-levels, respectively.
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 2.3 Common trends assumption test, 1994-1999
Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment
Leads and Lags

4 Years

4 ½ Years

5 Years

6 Years

NMLLS t-2

-.004
(.035)

-.014
(.040)

-.006
(.045)

-.018
(.047)

NMLLS t-1

.005
(.036)

-.021
(.042)

-.025
(.046)

-.041
(.049)

NMLLS t0

.012
(.035)

-.001
(.040)

-.024
(.045)

-.019
(.047)

NMLLS t+1

.027
(.034)

.010
(.039)

.012
(.044)

.00007
(.047)

NMLLS t+2

-.004
(.034)

.006
(.038)

.004
(.043)

.010
(.045)

R2

.0872

.1020

.1131

.1173

Observations

11,258

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Ordinary least squares
estimates for all students entering UNM between 1994 – 1999 given. Reported
coefficients are on interactions between cohort years and a resident dummy
variable. Models include resident and cohort dummies as well as controls for
race, ethnicity, standardized test scores, high school GPA, gender, and family
income. The period t0 is 1997, the year the NMLLS was implemented. *, **, and
*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.
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Table 2.4 Common trends assumption test, 1994-1999, HSGPA ≤ 3.28
Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment
Leads and Lags

4 Years

4 ½ Years

5 Years

6 Years

NMLLS t-2

.003
(.033)

.009
(.038)

.005
(.052)

.005
(.057)

NMLLS t-1

-.023
(.038)

-.031
(.048)

-.019
(.057)

-.034
(.064)

NMLLS t0

-.037
(.037)

-.064
(.047)

-.092
(.058)

-.102
(.062)

NMLLS t+1

.005
(.031)

-.020
(.042)

-.073
(.055)

-.111*
(.060)

NMLLS t+2

.015
(.029)

-.002
(.039)

-.039
(.053)

-.032
(.056)

R2

.0177

.0306

.0435

.0520

Observations

5,502

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Ordinary least squares
estimates for all students entering UNM between 1994 – 1999 with less than or
equal to average high school GPAs given. Reported coefficients are on
interactions between cohort years and a resident dummy variable. Models
include resident and cohort dummies as well as controls for race, ethnicity,
standardized test scores, high school GPA, gender, and family income. The
period t0 is 1997, the year the NMLLS was implemented. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.
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Table 2.5 Common trends assumption test, 1994-1999, HSGPA > 3.28
Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment
Leads and Lags

4 Years

4 ½ Years

5 Years

6 Years

NMLLS t-2

-.005
(.065)

-.034
(.071)

-.013
(.076)

-.038
(.077)

NMLLS t-1

.022
(.063)

-.023
(.070)

-.038
(.074)

-.052
(.075)

NMLLS t0

.047
(.060)

.038
(.065)

.020
(.071)

.036
(.072)

NMLLS t+1

.046
(.060)

.028
(.066)

.080
(.071)

.089
(.072)

NMLLS t+2

-.007
(.060)

.018
(.064)

.044
(.069)

.043
(.070)

R2

.0685

.0663

.0651

.0620

Observations

5,756

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Ordinary least squares
estimates for all students entering UNM between 1994 – 1999 with above average
high school GPAs given. Reported coefficients are on interactions between
cohort years and a resident dummy variable. Models include resident and cohort
dummies as well as controls for race, ethnicity, standardized test scores, high
school GPA, gender, and family income. The period t 0 is 1997, the year the
NMLLS was implemented. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.
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Table 2.6 Common trends assumption test, 1994-1999, HSGPA > 3.78
Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment
Leads and Lags

4 Years

4 ½ Years

5 Years

6 Years

NMLLS t-2

.067
(.119)

-.012
(.122)

.032
(.128)

-.011
(.130)

NMLLS t-1

-.035
(.124)

-.143
(.127)

-.066
(.133)

-.083
(.133)

NMLLS t0

.148
(.121)

.161
(.123)

.198
(.131)

.220*
(.134)

NMLLS t+1

.003
(.123)

-.021
(.125)

.068
(.129)

.072
(.131)

NMLLS t+2

.051
(.118)

.031
(.121)

.089
(.126)

.053
(.129)

R2

.0608

.0623

.0594

.0451

Observations

2,112

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Ordinary least squares
estimates for all students entering UNM between 1994 – 1999 with high school
GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean are given. Reported
coefficients are on interactions between cohort years and a resident dummy
variable. Models include resident and cohort dummies as well as controls for
race, ethnicity, standardized test scores, high school GPA, gender, and family
income. The period t0 is 1997, the year the NMLLS was implemented. *, **, and
*** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.
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Table 2.7 NMLLS student attrition, 1994-1999
Semester

Residents Eligible

Percent Remaining

2

2,664

100.0%

3

2,249

84.4%

4

2,017

75.7%

5

1,863

69.9%

6

1,734

65.1%

7

1,629

61.1%

8

1,568

58.9%

9
1,510
56.7%
Source: Office of Institutitonal Analystics, University of New
Mexico. We consider the sample of resident students that met
cumulative GPA and credit requirements in their first semester to
qualify for the NMLLS.
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Table 2.8 Estimated parameters for propensity score model of NMLLS data, 1994-1999
Variable

Estimate

Std. Error

HSGPA
ACT
Remedial
Income < 20K
Income < 40K
Female
Hispanic
Native American
Asian
Black
Declined to state race-ethnicity
ACT2
ACT*Black
Female*White
HSGPA2
ACT*Female
ACT*HSGPA
Remedial*Asian
GPA*Black
ACT*Native
Female*Native
HSGPA*Hispanic

1.729**
.498***
.891***
.268*
.160
1.670***
1.865***
1.884**
.032
-5.729***
-.108
-.013***
.141***
-.571***
-.461***
-.053***
.059***
1.147**
.546
-.082**
-.608*
-.312*

.724
.090
.118
.158
.108
.367
.550
.923
.207
1.155
.282
.002
.045
.146
.116
.016
.020
.505
.339
.041
.317
.165

Constant

-7.711***

1.600

Observations

11,258

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * correspond to
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Propensity scores are estimated using a logistic model. Forty-nine
observations were dropped following estimation of the propensity
score to ensure overlap, leaving 11,209 observations. The variable
Declined to state race-ethnicity is equal to one if the student declined
to state their race-ethnicity, and zero otherwise.
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Table 2.9 Power calculation for regressions on subgroups, 1994-1999

Power

Obs.

Nonresidents
Mean
SD
Obs.

0.495
0.458
0.497
0.474

9978
4901
5077
1879

0.327
0.199
0.438
0.509

0.469
0.4
0.497
0.501

1231
572
657
226

0.995
0.654
0.985
0.872

Family Income < $40,000
Full Sample
0.366
0.482
HSGPA ≤0.236
3.28
0.425
HSGPA >0.492
3.28
0.5
HSGPA >0.602
3.78
0.49

2104
1037
1067
374

0.276
0.181
0.379
0.5

0.448
0.387
0.488
0.509

192
94
95
30

0.437
0.153
0.381
0.231

Family Income ≥ $40,000
Full Sample
0.448
0.497
HSGPA ≤0.316
3.28
0.465
HSGPA >0.575
3.28
0.495
HSGPA >0.676
3.78
0.468

7874
3864
4010
1505

0.336
0.2
0.449
0.51

0.474
0.4
0.498
0.501

1034
471
561
196

0.985
0.584
0.968
0.814

Group

Mean

All Family Incomes
Full Sample
0.43
HSGPA ≤0.299
3.28
HSGPA >0.557
3.28
HSGPA >0.661
3.78

Residents
SD

Note: We calculate the power to detect a five percent change in completion rates at the
five percent significance level. This is done by testing the difference-in-differences
estimator in a linear probability model of six-year completion rates.
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Table 2.10: Means and normalized differences after kernel matching, full sample, 19941999

Variable

Res.

Pre-NMLLS
Nonres.

HS GPA

3.31

3.27

0.088

3.27

3.33

-0.122

Composite ACT

22.56

22.37

0.047

22.19

22.58

-0.099

Remedial

0.26

0.24

0.032

0.29

0.28

0.012

Income < $40,000

0.22

0.21

0.04

0.2

0.21

-0.032

Female

0.57

0.58

-0.009

0.56

0.59

-0.063

Hispanic

0.39

0.39

-0.019

0.37

0.36

0.025

Native

0.04

0.04

0.001

0.05

0.05

-0.03

Asian

0.04

0.03

0.058

0.04

0.03

0.019

Black

0.02

0.02

-0.023

0.02

0.02

0.018

ND

Post-NMLLS
Res.
Nonres.

ND

Means are from Epanechnikov kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2.
Normalized differences (ND) are calculated by taking the difference average covariate
values by residency status and dividing by a measure of standard deviation.

51

Table 2.11: NMLLS graduation effects by years since first enrollment, kernel matching,
1994-1999
Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment
Group
Full Sample

Obs.
11,209

𝑌
GPA ≤ 3.28

5,473

𝑌
GPA > 3.28

5,734

𝑌
GPA > 3.78

𝑌

2,105

4 Years

4 ½ Years

5 Years

6 Years

-.035
(.023)

-.030
(.027)

-.024
(.033)

-.019
(.035)

.114

.195

.345

.447

-.015
(.022)

-.035
(.029)

-.069*
(.040)

-.087**
(.043)

.044

.094

.222

.316

-.022
(.036)

.016
(.043)

.069
(.048)

.094*
(.050)

.176

.284

.453

.561

.031
(.070)

.082
(.072)

.093
(.080)

.107
(.081)

.246

.359

.542

.642

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from differencein-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using the
Epanechnikov kernel function. We report estimates for students with below average or
average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and high
school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78). 𝑌 denotes the
baseline graduation rate by high school performance and years since first enrollment.
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Table 2.12: NMLLS graduation effects, kernel matching, family income < $40,000,
1994-1999
Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment
Group
Full Sample

Obs.
2,296

𝑌
GPA ≤ 3.28

1,131

𝑌
GPA > 3.28

1,162

𝑌
GPA > 3.78

𝑌

404

4 Years

4 ½ Years

5 Years

6 Years

-.011
(.038)

-.012
(.043)

-.037
(.060)

-.020
(.070)

.085

.139

.276

.377

.003
(.011)

-.018
(.032)

-.197**
(.081)

-.202**
(.090)

.030

.064

.180

.257

.022
(.076)

.037
(.082)

.161
(.100)

.200*
(.115)

.136

.207

.363

.486

-.091
(.148)

-.032
(.168)

.151
(.221)

.054
(.228)

.164

.270

.478

.629

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from differencein-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using the
Epanechnikov kernel function. We report estimates for students with below average or
average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and high
school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78). 𝑌 denotes the
baseline graduation rate by high school performance and years since first enrollment.
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Table 2.13: NMLLS graduation effects, kernel matching, family income ≥ $40,000,
1994-1999
Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment
Group
Full Sample

Obs.
8,908

𝑌
GPA ≤ 3.28

4,335

𝑌
GPA > 3.28

4,571

𝑌
GPA > 3.78

𝑌

1,701

4 Years

4 ½ Years

5 Years

6 Years

-.035
(.027)

-.028
(.031)

-.015
(.037)

-.010
(.039)

.122

.212

.365

.467

-.018
(.028)

-.040
(.036)

-.035
(.045)

-.055
(.048)

.048

.104

.234

.335

-.027
(.041)

.011
(.047)

.033
(.052)

.058
(.052)

.187

.307

.480

.583

.055
(.075)

.109
(.077)

.096
(.084)

.130
(.085)

.269

.384

.560

.646

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from
difference-in-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using
the Epanechnikov kernel function. We report estimates for students with below
average or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (>
3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (>
3.78). 𝑌 denotes the baseline graduation rate by high school performance and years
since first enrollment.
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Table 2.14. Testing for manipulation of the bridging semester GPA cutoff for NMLLS
eligibility
Bandwidths
left
right

Effective Obs.
left
right

Conv. Test
T
p-value

Robust Test
T
p-value

h- ≠ h+
T2(h1)

0.511

0.524

1748

4591

5.263

< .001

3.831

< .001

T3(h2)

0.489

0.445

1591

3806

4.109

< .001

4.245

< .001

T4(h3)

0.653

0.616

1977

5433

3.096

0.002

4.895

< .001

T2(h1)

0.524

0.524

1750

4591

5.270

< .001

3.822

< .001

T3(h2)

0.445

0.445

1569

3806

4.090

< .001

4.564

< .001

T4(h3)

0.616

0.616

1903

5433

3.095

0.002

5.193

< .001

h- = h+

Note: Here we present results from manipulation test following McCrary (2008) and Cattaneo et al.
(2017). The subscript on T denotes the order of the local polynomial used to construct the biascorrected density point estimators. The subscript on h denotes the order of the local polynomial used to
construct the density point estimates. A uniform kernel was used to construct local polynomial estimators.
We perform tests with identical and different data-driven bandwidths. Conventional and robust test
staistics test the null hypothesis of continuity of the bridging semester GPA around the NMLLS eligibility
cutoff.
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https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/04/04/sanders-democratic-colleaguesintroduce-new-free-college-bill. New York recently launched the Excelsior Scholarship,
making tuition at all SUNY and CUNY two- and four-year colleges free for residents
from families with annual incomes up to $125,000. Retrieved 1 November 2017 from
https://www.ny.gov/programs/tuition-free-degree-program-excelsior-scholarship.
6

Because Scott-Clayton did not limit the sample to those who took the ACT only

once, her marginal program students were able to manipulate their test scores, so that
those above differed in unobserved characteristics, like ambition. But even though Bruce
and Carruthers limit their sample to students who took the ACT only once, they face a
similar situation: students just below the cutoff sample who did not re-test might contain
a higher proportion of low-ambition students, relative to those just above the cutoff, who
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had less incentive to retest. Thus selection alone is unlikely to explain the discrepancy
between the studies.
7

We were unable to find any reference to the cutoff online, except as reported in

Castleman and Long, and that figure is more than 10 years old.
8
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PE_Scholarship_Program_Overview.aspx.
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http://www.floridastudentfinancialaid.org/ssfad/PDF/BFEligibilityAwardChart.pdf.
11

1995-1996 Federal Pell Grant Program End-of-Year Report, U.S. Department of

Education, online at https://www2.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/data/pell-historical/pelleoy-1995-96.pdf (accessed 26 March 2017).
12

King, Jacqueline E. “Missed Opportunities: Students who do not Apply for

Financial Aid,” American Council on Education Issue Brief, 2004. Online at
http://www.soe.vt.edu/highered/files/Perspectives_PolicyNews/10-04/2004FAFSA.pdf
(accessed 1 April 2017).
13

For degree earning students entering UNM between 1994 and 1999, average
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time to degree was 4.79 years with a standard deviation of .66 years.
14

We conduct a sequential search for quadratic terms to include in the propensity

score model. We start by estimating logistic models that include all terms in levels and
one of all possible quadratic terms. We then calculate the likelihood ratio statistic for the
null hypothesis that the most recently added quadratic term has a coefficient of zero. We
select for inclusion the quadratic term with the highest test statistic over 2.71,
corresponding to a z-statistic of 1.645. We then add this covariate to the “baseline”
model and repeat this process until all the remaining likelihood ratio statistics are below
the threshold of 2.71.
15

There are 9,979 resident students and only 1,233 nonresident students in the

sample. One-to-many matching allows us to proceed without a significant loss in
information. For example, if we were to conduct a simple nearest neighbor matching
procedure, estimates would (at most) be based on 1,233 matches, or 2,466 observations,
which constitutes approximately 22 percent of the sample.
16

Results are similar when we split the sample around the median high school

17

We also used New Mexican residents who delayed enrollment (and were

GPA.

therefore not eligible for NMLLS) as a control group. These non-traditional students are
likely to differ in unobservable ways from students who entered college right away,
especially given the large tuition penalty for delaying enrollment once the NMLLS was
in place. A student who missed out on the scholarship by delaying enrollment might
have less maturity or some difficulty to overcome before starting college, characteristics
that would also make completion less likely. Indeed, in models that use non-traditional
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students as the control group, we find unrealistically large program effects of 27.4
percentage points (76.3 percent) overall for students from lower income families.
Program effects for high achieving, low income students are estimated to be 46
percentage points (93.9 percent). These effects likely tell us more about the negative
chances of students who were unable to enroll in college right away, than the positive
impact on graduation.
18

US. Federal Housing Finance Agency, All-Transactions House Price Index for

Albuquerque, NM (MSA), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Retrieved September 22,
2016 from https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ATNHPIUS10740Q. July 1994 to July 1999
is examined. Prices are adjusted for inflation using BLS’s CPI less shelter measure
(Series CUUR0000SA0L2), retrieved 18 Aug 2017 from https://data.bls.gov/cgibin/srgate.
19

The $215,000 figure is the median listed home price in Albuquerque according

to Zillow.com as of June 30, 2017. Obtained 18 Aug 2017 at
https://www.zillow.com/albuquerque-nm/home-values/.
20

Calculations using Bureau of Economic Analysis’ annual personal income

estimates for 1994 and 1999 (SA1 Personal Income Summary: Personal Income,
Population, Per Capita Personal Income) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ annual CPIU estimates for 1994 and 1999 (Series CUUR0000SA0). Retrieved 18 Aug 2017 from
https://www.bea.gov/itable/ and https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate, respectively.
21

Interview with Dr. Terry Babbitt, Vice President of the Enrollment

Management Division, conducted April 19, 2017.
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Chapter 3:

Wage Effects of Baccalaureate Time to Degree in the United States

Only 42 percent of students earning baccalaureate degrees in the United States
graduate within four years, compared to 53 percent three decades ago. Despite this shift,
and plenty of concern about potential harm to students on behalf of state legislators and
university officials, we know very little about whether delayed graduation carries a labor
market penalty. Researchers examining time to degree using cross-sectional data report a
negative relationship between time to degree and earnings, which presumably reflects
ability. Increases in time to degree, however, cannot reasonably be linked to lower
ability over time. Using two nationally-representative longitudinal studies, we proxy for
student ability and instrument for time to degree, and find no evidence of a labor market
penalty for delayed graduation. Moreover, the potential loss of earnings from later postgraduation entry into the labor market may easily be countered by higher earnings during
school for those who take longer to finish. Together, these findings suggest that taking
longer to complete college is not necessarily a problem that needs fixing.
3.1 Introduction
Most college graduates in the United States spend more than four years earning a
baccalaureate degree, a fact that has drawn alarm from some researchers, policymakers,
and media outlets. Among the proposed remedies are higher penalties for withdrawing
from courses, course credit pricing penalizing students taking fewer than 15 credits, and
endorsement of “lockstep” programs that restrict student choice in courses, making it
more difficult to change majors.22 In 2016, the Obama administration proposed two
significant changes to the federal Pell Grant program. The first provision would have
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provided approximately 700,000 students “making real progress toward on time
graduation” with an additional $1,915 on average to help pay for college and complete
their degrees faster.” The second provision, dubbed the “on-track Pell bonus,” would
have raise the maximum Pell award by $300 for approximately 2.3 million students that
take 15 credits per semester in an academic year, a policy meant to encourage the receipt
of a bachelor’s degree in four years.23 Critics contend that such policies overload
students that necessarily work during college, or that enter higher education marginally
prepared for college-level courses. Kinsey and Goldrick-Rab (2015) provide evidence
that tying additional need-based aid to academic performance may only serve to slow
down students, which may take fewer classes the next semester if their current semester
GPA suffers. Support for such incentives remains broad, however. Backers of these
measures cite the high cost to students of delaying entry into the labor market,
particularly how lengthened time to degree may encourage students to take on additional
debt. We are interested in whether “delayed” students incur wage penalties beyond
opportunity costs associated with solely taking longer to obtain a degree. This is a
contemporary issue: in 2012 alone, Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, and New
Mexico passed legislation aimed at reducing time to degree at their public universities.
Time to degree has increased dramatically in recent decades. In the 1970s, 53
percent of college graduates earned their degrees in four years. Twenty years later, only
39 percent had done so. For non-top-50 public universities the decline was even
steeper—from 50 percent in the 1970s to 29 percent in the 1990s. Researchers posit the
trend cannot be explained by changes in student preparedness or composition, and instead
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find evidence that decreased resources per student at less selective public universities and
students working more during college are likely causes (Bound et al., 2012). Students
who work more while enrolled in college have lower opportunity costs and it may be that
the reduced opportunity costs compensate for delayed entry into the labor market.
Students have always had the option of taking more credits and not changing majors, so it
bears exploring whether going through college more slowly might be a good strategy,
rather than a mistake.
We address this question in two steps. First, we examine a simple human capital
model to explore under what circumstances combining part-time work and a 5- or 6-year
path to degree attainment might be optimal. Second, we ask whether longer time to
degree is penalized in the labor market. For the latter question, human capital theory
holds that additional years of education increases the productivity of workers, thereby
affording higher wages in the labor market. Under human capital, if students complete
the same amount of credits over a longer period of time, then time to degree should have
no direct effect on wages. Yet, if time to degree serves as a productivity signal to
employers, then those finishing sooner versus later may be valued as being more
productive in the labor market.
Several researchers report a negative association between earnings and time to
degree, which they attribute to student ability. This association alone does not rule out
the human capital hypothesis, since the real test is whether workers with the same ability,
but different time to degree, are compensated differently. We perform this test by
controlling for ability and instrumenting for time to degree with the institutional average.
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We believe our instrument is plausible because institutional policies and norms surely
affect a student’s college trajectory, but should have no bearing on labor market rewards
apart from the institution’s quality, which we also control for.
Our findings suggest that concern over delayed graduation may be misplaced.
Under plausible assumptions about hours worked in college, the return to a college
degree, and discount rates, students may come out ahead when they work while earning a
degree in five or six years. Addressing endogeneity using Two Stage Least Squares
(2SLS), we find time to degree has no association with near-term labor market earnings.
3.2 Simple model of human capital
We appeal to a simplified discrete multi-stage human capital investment problem
similar to Turner (2004). The framework is modified to examine the circumstances under
which students rationally prefer a mixture of part-time work (i.e., 30 hours per week) and
part-time school (i.e., six years to graduation), to working 10 hours per week, attending
college full-time, and graduating in the “normal time” of four academic years.
Define 𝑌

and 𝑌 as earnings before and after college completion, respectively.

For ease of exposition, we assume students in this scenario may work 30 hours per week,
earning 𝑌 each year, and attend school part-time for six years, paying 𝐹 annually in
direct costs. Students may also choose to work 10 hours per week, attend school fulltime, and graduate in four years. We assume that the costs of part-time and full-time
enrollment are equal. Students prefer to earn a baccalaureate degree in six years while
working part time over the traditional four-year path to degree attainment if
(1)
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(

)

+∑

(

)

−∑

(

)

> ∑
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holds, a condition that may be reduced to
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)

(
(

)
)

.24

Whether equation (2) holds depends on parameters in the maximization problem,
including student risk preferences, direct college costs, and the returns to a baccalaureate
degree. All else equal, students are more likely to pursue a nontraditional (and longer)
path to college completion when 1) discount rates are high, 2) the returns to a college
degree are lower, and 3) the direct costs of schooling are relatively low. For example,
using figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, let YHS = $34,600 and YC = $57,800.25
To demonstrate how time to degree may vary, we choose one non-top 50 public
university (University of New Mexico) and one top 50 public university (University of
Washington) where F is equal to $7,146 and $10,974, respectively. Assuming a fairly
standard discount rate of r = .05, the simplified model results in the UNM student
preferring to take six years while working part-time over the traditional four-year path
working ten hours per week. Because direct college costs are larger, the UW student
prefers the traditional four-year path under these conditions. However, if we increase the
discount rate to r = .10 then both the UNM and UW students prefer the nontraditional
path to degree attainment. Note that this simplification of human capital assumes no
uncertainty regarding the costs and benefits of college, and does not consider the
possibility of binding credit constraints. However, the exercise demonstrates that
students may rationally choose a longer, nontraditional path to degree attainment under
reasonable assumptions.
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3.3 Is delayed graduation punished in the labor market?
Existing literature does not answer the question of whether lengthened time to
degree penalizes workers. Previous studies do not control for one confounding factor or
another: none control for institutional characteristics, which likely impact both time to
degree and earnings after graduation (Groot and Oosterbeek, 1994; Brodaty et al., 2009;
Flores-Lagunes and Light, 2010; Aina and Pastore, 2012). Only Groot and Oosterbeek
(1994) include a proxy for student ability. Without adequately controlling (or
instrumenting) for such factors, it is impossible to isolate the effect of time to degree in
the earnings function. For example, low ability students generally earn less money than
their high ability counterparts, but will still increase their earnings by obtaining a degree.
Moreover, students that attend lower quality institutions may earn less than those
attending higher quality institutions, however it may be the characteristics of the
institution that are contributing to the wage penalty, not necessarily the time it takes the
student to complete. It is thus unlikely that previous studies are able to fully separate
student and institutional characteristics from time to degree.
To operationalize our investigation of wages and time to degree, we present a
linear model of wages for baccalaureate degree earners closely following that of Brodaty
et al. (2009). Let 𝑑 be the graduate’s time to degree in months. Subscripts are omitted for
ease of exposition. Graduation delay, 𝐷, is defined as the individual’s time to degree less
“normal time” to degree, defined as 45 months, so that 𝐷 ≡ 𝑑 − 45.26 We assume that an
individual’s productivity is given by 𝑞 and takes the form
(4)

𝑙𝑛(𝑞) = 𝑎 𝑆 + 𝑏 𝐷 + 𝑿𝑐 + 𝜃 + 𝜃
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where 𝑿 is a vector of controls (including potential experience and its square, race, ethnicity,
and gender) observed by both the researcher and the employer. Graduate degree attainment
is given by 𝑆, indicating receipt of a master’s or doctoral degree at the time of follow-up.
The direct productivity effect of schooling is given by 𝑎 , which we expect to be
nonnegative. Similarly the direct productivity effect of graduation delay is 𝑏 , expected to be
nonnegative since it can be viewed as a measure of age or maturity. The terms 𝜃 and 𝜃
measure student ability, the former being observed only by the employer, the latter
unobserved by both the researcher and the employer. Ability measures are assumed to be
normally distributed with mean zero, finite variances, and nonnegative covariances.
Employers observe graduation delay, given by
(5)

𝐷 = 𝑿𝑐 + 𝒁𝑔 + 𝑓 𝜃 + 𝜉
where 𝜃 is another unobserved measure of student ability that is likely positively

correlated with 𝜃 and 𝜃 . The vector 𝒁 captures exogenous sources of variation in
graduation delay not observed by the employer, assumed to be uncorrelated with 𝜃 for
all 𝑗. These instruments affect graduation delay but are not reported in job application
materials nor are they otherwise observable by the potential employer. 27 To identify a
causal link between time to degree and subsequent wages, graduation delay is
instrumented using the ratio of six- to four-year graduation rates at the student’s degree
granting university.
If employers set wages equal to the expected productivity of workers, conditional
on their information set, wages can be expressed as
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(6)

𝑤 = 𝐸[𝑞|𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃 ].
We assume that wages are distributed as log-normal. Since ability and error terms

are normally distributed, 𝑙𝑛(𝑞) conditional on (𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃 ) is also normally distributed.
Thus, we may write
(7)

𝑤 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝐸[𝑙𝑛(𝑞)|𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃 ] + 𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑙𝑛(𝑞)|𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃 ]}.
Normal vectors exhibit the property that the conditional variance

𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑙𝑛(𝑞)|𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃 ] does not depend on (𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃 ), meaning we can treat it as a
constant and include it in 𝑿. This gives us the equation
(8)

𝑙𝑛(𝑤) = 𝑎 𝑆 + 𝑏 𝐷 + 𝑿𝑐 + 𝜃 + 𝐸[𝜃 |𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃 ].
Having assumed that ability is normally distributed, conditional expectations are

linear and given by
(9)

𝐸[𝜃 |𝑿, 𝑆, 𝐷, 𝜃 ] = 𝑎 𝑆 + 𝑏 𝐷 + 𝑿𝑐 + 𝑓 𝜃

which can be substituted in equation (8) to arrive at a modified version of Mincer’s
(1974) human capital earnings function
(10)

𝑙𝑛(𝑤) = (𝑎 + 𝑎 )𝑆 + (𝑏 + 𝑏 )𝐷 + 𝑿(𝑐 + 𝑐 ) + (1 + 𝑓 )𝜃 .
Note that graduation delay appears in the earnings function as it is a signal

conveying information about unobserved productivity, 𝜃 . The coefficient on graduation
delay is composed into two components: 𝑏 , the direct productivity effect of graduation
delay and 𝑏 , the signaling effect of graduation delay, each which are not identified
individually. We infer whether results support human capital or the screening hypothesis
based on the sign of (𝑏 + 𝑏 ). As mentioned, we expect 𝑏 to be nonnegative in sign.
Thus, if the coefficient on graduation delay is negative, this constitutes evidence of time
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to degree communicating a negative productivity signal. A nonnegative coefficient on
graduation delay is considered support for human capital theory.
3.4. NCES data
We use ELS:2002 data for our analysis, which allows us to observe students’
secondary, postsecondary, and subsequent labor market outcomes for the 2004 graduating
high school cohort. The ELS:2002 documentation explicitly notes the survey was
intended to inform policymakers of the “rate of progress through postsecondary
curriculum” and the “social and economic rate of return on education to both the
individual and society” (Ingalls et al. 2014, pp. 10). The dependent variable in our
analysis is the natural log of hourly wages in 2011 dollars. This measure is obtained
from sample members at the fourth and final follow-up. The final follow-up takes place
eight years after students’ high school graduation cohort date, defined as June 1, 2004.
We limit the sample to college students who earned a high school diploma and enrolled
in college within two years. This includes students who did not graduate high school in
normal time. Because the survey only follows students eight years after their expected
high school graduation, it does not permit analysis of nontraditional students such as
those that matriculate in their late 20s or later.
Bound et al. (2012) find that trends in time to degree across 1972 and 1992
graduating high school cohorts vary significantly according to the student’s first
institution type. The authors classify students’ first institutions into five categories: nontop 50 public colleges, top 50 public colleges, less selective private colleges, highly
selective private colleges, and community colleges. This categorization is based on 2005
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U.S. News & World Report college rankings. Highly selective private colleges include
the top 50 ranked private colleges, the top 65 ranked liberal arts colleges, and four U.S.
Armed Services Academies: the U.S. Military Academy at Westpoint, the U.S. Naval
Academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, and the U.S. Air Force Academy. We use the
same categorization scheme as Bound et al. (2012), with the exception of excluding
students that started at community colleges since they do not have selectivity or
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) data. 28
Several variables are included in wage equations in order to help isolate the effect
of time to degree on earnings. Standardized test scores, measured in terms of the
composite ACT score, are included to capture observed student ability. 29 Higher
standardized test score achievement is expected to be positively correlated with future
earnings (Betts and Grogger, 2003). Potential work experience and its square are
included, as workers earn more as they acquire additional labor market experience, but at
a diminishing rate (Mincer, 1974; Heckman et al., 2003; Lemieux, 2006). Variables
capturing whether a post-baccalaureate degree has been earned are included, as additional
credentials are expected to increase future earnings (Card, 2001). Also included are
controls for respondent gender, race, and ethnicity. A set of state dummies account for
heterogeneity across labor markets in the United States. Institution quality is proxied
using the 2004 Barron’s Admissions Competitiveness Index. We instrument the
student’s time to degree with the ratio of six- to four-year graduation rates at the student’s
first institution. These rates are reported in the IPEDS. This measure is intended to
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capture the prevalence of graduation beyond normal time at the institution-level. 30 See
Table 3.2 for descriptive statistics of the instrument for various institution types.
Table 3.11 presents the cumulative distribution of time to degree as well as its
mean for ELS:2002 data. We include data from Bound et al. (2012) in order to examine
whether trends in time to baccalaureate degree have persisted using this most recent
NCES survey. Table 3.1 suggests that the overall mean time to degree has not changed
significantly across 1992 and 2004 graduating high school cohorts, standing most
recently at 4.83 years. Average time to degree for those at non-top 50 public colleges
held steady at 4.93 years across 1992 and 2004 cohorts. At top 50 public schools there
was a marked decrease in time to degree from 4.66 to 4.42 years, an average difference of
approximately three months. The percent of graduates completing in four years or less at
these schools increased from approximately 40 to 57 percent. There were small increases
(decreases) in time to degree for students starting at highly (less) selective private
institutions. Overall it seems that the alarming increases in time to baccalaureate degree
found by Bound et al. (2012) may have slowed if not stabilized.
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics by first institution type for variables
included in the analysis. The average hourly wage for the full sample is $20.57, with
wages highest for those starting at highly selective private institutions, and lowest for
those starting at non-top 50 public institutions. Graduation delay varies widely according
to first institution type. It averages just under one year for students at non-top 50 public
universities but is only approximately 3.5 months for students at highly selective private
schools. Figure 3.1 presents a histogram of graduation delay, revealing that roughly 45
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percent of students in the sample graduated within six months of normal time. The
largest spike in delay is between zero and six months after the 45-month mark, where the
distribution decays thereafter. The instrumental variable, time to degree ratio, averages
roughly two for the full sample. This is interpreted as having twice as many students
graduating within six years relative to four years. We see similar variation by institution
type compared to the graduation delay variable. Approximately 24 percent of the full
sample had a master’s degree at the last follow-up, while six percent held a doctoral
degree. ACT composite scores are lowest for students starting at non-top 50 public
institutions, and highest for those starting at highly selective private institutions. The
majority of the sample consists of white women.
3.5. Results
3.5.1 Hausman Test for Endogeneity
We first wish to examine whether it is even necessary to use 2SLS in estimating
wage penalties from delayed baccalaureate graduation. This can be done through
implementing Hausman’s (1978) test for endogeneity. This test offers a formal way of
examining whether the error term in the earnings function is correlated with our measure
of graduation delay. To conduct this test, we estimate the reduced form equation for
graduation delay and save the fitted residuals from this equation. We then estimate the
earnings function including all of exogenous variables, graduation delay, and the fitted
residual. Rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the fitted residual is not
statistically different from zero suggests that graduation delay is endogenous, and 2SLS
must be used. We estimate the coefficient on the fitted residual to be 0.1003 with a
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standard error of 0.0385, providing strong evidence that endogeneity of the time-todegree variable in the wage equation is a problem that must be dealt with.
3.5.2 Instrument Relevance and Instrument Exogeneity
Valid estimation via 2SLS requires two conditions be met. First, the instrument
should be highly correlated with the endogenous variable. This can be assessed using a
simple t-test on the instrument in the first stage equation. Second, the instrument should
only affect the dependent variable through the endogenous variable. Because the latter
requires knowledge of the true model error, this requirement cannot be tested and instead
must be maintained. Table 3.3 presents results for the full sample. We note that the first
stage regression suggests strong positive correlation between time to degree ratio and
graduation delay variables. A one-unit increase in the time to degree ratio increases
graduation delay by just less than one month. We reject the null of the simple t-test at the
one percent level, providing evidence of instrument relevance. An F-statistic of 11.71 in
the first stage suggests the 2SLS model does not suffer from weak instruments.
Instrument exogeneity requires that time to degree at the student’s institution only
affects earnings through the student’s time to degree. We suspect that time to degree at
the student’s institution affects the student’s own time to degree through what could be
considered a sort of “peer effect.” If a large proportion of one’s peers in college are
planning on overshooting normal time, the student may be more likely to consider this a
valid path to degree attainment.31 There are many other reasons why this relationship
may hold as well. It may reflect institution quality in some broad sense, the resources
available to the student, or the additional tuition costs associated with delayed graduation.
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This motivates us to include the admissions competitiveness index in the models in order
to capture many broad measures of institution quality, helping to isolate the causal path
from institution time to degree to wages through the student’s own time to degree.
First stage results show that higher ability translates into shorter time to degree,
consistent with Flores-Lagunes and Light (2010). Women were found to be less likely to
exceed graduation in normal time, while Hispanic students were shown to have longer
time to degree. We interpret admissions competitiveness dummies as relative to schools
deemed as “Most Competitive.” Coefficients on these measures suggest that the less
competitive the school, the higher the time to degree. Wage equation estimates also bear
many features that one would expect from an earnings function. We see large positive
returns to obtaining a master’s and doctoral degree. Wages are increasing in experience,
but at a decreasing rate. Higher ability results in higher wages—a ten point increase in
the composite ACT score results in a ten percent increase in wages. Results reveal a 5.4
percent wage penalty for women compared to men, a 9.4 percent for black workers
compared to white. Students starting at less competitive colleges earn lower wages.
Most importantly, Table 3.3 reveals a pattern we find repeatedly—while OLS
estimates find that a one month delay in graduation results in wage penalty of
approximately 0.5 percent (approximately six percent for one year of delay), we find no
evidence of any wage penalty after instrumenting for graduation delay. OLS estimates,
of which previous studies report similar effect sizes, are clearly misleading. Table 3.4
provides evidence that results do not differ by the student’s first institution type. Nontop-50 public schools, top-50 public schools, and less selective private schools again
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reveal one-month graduation delay penalties of 0.5-0.6 percent (6-7 percent per year),
while 2SLS reveal no penalty. For highly selective private schools, both OLS and 2SLS
results are statistically insignificant.
Overall, preliminary findings support the human capital hypothesis that earning
the same degree over a varying length of time has no effect on the returns to a college
degree. In other words, we find no evidence that time to degree serves as a productivity
signal to prospective employers.
3.6 Conclusions
Time to degree may be costly for students, institutions, and society at large. Our
results provide evidence that delaying one’s graduation does not result in any sort of
wage penalty. It is hoped this study will inform policymakers on the costs and benefits of
lengthened time to degree, especially those at institutions currently considering or
actively discouraging alternative paths to degree completion which take longer than
normal time. Reducing time to degree, which appears to have been taking place at some
institutions since the study of the 1992 high school cohort, may free up additional
resources for new students. Our results provide evidence that utility-maximizing students
may be better off pursuing a longer path to degree attainment. It is important to then
consider the growing proportion of nontraditional students in higher education, and to
promote policies accommodating their rational decision to work during school and take
fewer credit hours per semester, in contrast to supporting policies which penalize students
for not remaining on track to graduate in four years—policies which may ultimately hurt
their very chances of completing college at all.
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Source: Education Longitudinal Study of 2002. TTD is the student’s time
to degree in months. The histogram displays the distribution of graduation
delay using six month bins. Approximately 45 percent of students in the
sample graduated with six months of normal time.
Figure 3.1 Histogram of graduation delay, baccalaureate earners, ELS:2002
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Table 3.1 Time to degree (TDD) distributions for all graduates by first institution type
4
Full Sample:
NLS72
NELS:88
ELS:2002

TTD Distribution
5
6

7

Mean
TTD

53.1
39.4
42.3

81.8
72.7
72.1

90.6
88.3
85.7

96.3
94.7
93.5

4.48
4.81
4.83

Non-top 50 public:
NLS72
49.7
NELS:88 29.1
ELS:2002 34.2

82.3
68.8
68.5

91.1
87.8
85.0

96.3
95.1
94.1

4.49
4.93
4.93

Top 50 public:
NLS72
NELS:88
ELS:2002

52.7
39.7
56.7

81.5
82.0
85.2

89.2
93.7
95.2

96.4
96.6
98.1

4.49
4.66
4.42

Less selective private:
NLS72
66.7
NELS:88 58.0
ELS:2002 56.1

87.3
84.6
83.4

94.0
93.4
92.5

98.7
98.6
96.1

4.28
4.60
4.51

Highly selective private:
NLS72
65.2
NELS:88 73.1
ELS:2002 68.6

88.2
91.9
91.7

93.8
98.1
96.3

96.8
99.8
98.2

4.31
4.20
4.28

Community college:
NLS72
36.5
NELS:88 15.5
ELS:2002 16.5

67.8
44.2
43.9

83.0
70.8
64.4

92.6
83.6
81.6

4.90
5.58
5.69

Note: NLS72 and NELS:88 figures reproduced from Bound,
Lovenheim, and Turner (2012). ELS:2002 calculations were made
using third follow up panel weights. In each survey the sample
includes baccaluareate-earners enrolling at a postsecondary
institution with two years of their high school cohort graduation
month. High school cohort graduation month is assumed to be June
1972 for NLS72, June 1992 for NELS:88, and June 2004 for
ELS:2002. Students were followed for eight years following their
high school cohort graduation month.
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Table 3.2 Sample characteristics of employed college graduates in the ELS:2002
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Table 3.3 OLS and 2SLS wage models of graduation delay penalty, all institutions
OLS

2SLS

(2)
Wages

(3)
Wages

-0.005***
(0.001)

0.006
(0.009)

Master's

0.204***
(0.064)

0.258***
(.0079)

Doctorate

0.537***
(0.130)

0.575***
(0.138)

VARIABLES

(1)
Graduation Delay

Graduation Delay
TTD Ratio

0.778***
(0.146)

Experience

0.839
(0.624)

0.198**
(0.090)

0.224**
(0.095)

Experience Squared

0.274**
(0.123)

-0.021*
(0.012)

-0.026**
(0.013)

ACT Composite

-0.424***
(0.055)

0.005**
(0.002)

0.010**
(0.005)

Female

-2.900***
(0.406)

-0.089***
(0.018)

-0.054*
(0.033)

Hispanic

1.999**
(0.841)

-0.016
(0.037)

-0.037
(0.042)

Black

0.735
(0.792)

-0.086**
(0.035)

-0.094**
(0.037)
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Table 3.3 OLS and 2SLS wage models of graduation delay penalty, all institutions
(continued)
OLS

2SLS

(1)
Graduation Delay

(2)
Wages

(3)
Wages

American Indian

-1.198
(3.324)

-0.049
(0.148)

-0.034
(0.152)

Asian

1.042
(0.918)

-0.000
(0.041)

-0.012
(0.043)

Two or More Races

-0.295
(1.042)

-0.050
(0.046)

-0.046
(0.048)

Hawaiin or Pacific Islander

-3.030
(5.235)

0.152
(0.232)

0.179
(0.240)

Highly Competitive

0.940
(0.855)

-0.003
(0.038)

-0.014
(0.040)

Very Competitive

1.717**
(0.774)

-0.001
(0.034)

-0.023
(0.039)

Competitive

2.883***
(0.802)

-0.047
(0.035)

-0.087*
(0.048)

Less Competitive

7.943***
(1.147)

0.010
(0.051)

-0.085
(0.091)

Non-Competitive

3.428**
(1.444)

-0.095
(0.064)

-0.144*
(0.076)

Special Designation

0.894
(3.030)

-0.018
(0.135)

-0.030
(0.139)

Observations
F-statistic
Adjusted R-squared

3,297
11.71
0.198

5.10
0.100

4.35
0.044

VARIABLES

Source: Education Longitudinal Study of 2002. Robust standard errors are reported below
estimated coefficients. The dependent variable is the natural log of hourly wages in 2011,
at the third follow-up. Time to degree is in months and centered at 45, the time it takes to
complete a bachelor's degree in "normal time." All specifications include state fixed effects.
In 2SLS specifications, the student's time to degree is instrumented by the ratio of six- to
four-year graduation rates at their university.
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Table 3.4 Estimates of graduation delay penalty by first institution type
Non-Top 50 Public
(1)
(2)
OLS
2SLS
Time-to-Degree
Observations
Adjusted R-Squared

Top 50 Public
(3)
(4)
OLS
2SLS

Less Selective Private
(5)
(6)
OLS
2SLS

Highly Selective Private
(7)
(8)
OLS
2SLS

-0.005
0.001

0.005
0.012

-0.006
0.002

-0.001
0.010

-0.006
0.002

-0.009
0.045

0.002
0.004

0.012
0.015

0.136

1369
0.090

0.221

713
0.208

0.174

780
0.170

0.241

435
0.227

Source: Education Longitudinal Study of 2002. Robust standard errors are reported below estimated coefficients. The dependent variable
is the natural log of hourly wages in 2011, at the third follow-up. Time to degree is in months and centered at 45, the time it takes to
complete a bachelor's degree in "normal time." All specifications include state fixed effects. In 2SLS specifications, the student's time to
degree is instrumented by the ratio of six- to four-year graduation rates at their university.
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Notes

22

See, for example, the “15 to Finish” policy promoted by Complete College

America and other nonprofits. Online at
http://completecollege.org/docs/GPS_Summary_FINAL.pdf, accessed 13 November
2016. As of 2013, five statewide higher education systems and at institutions in fifteen
states had adopted 15 to Finish. This information is online at
http://www.completecollege.org/news.html, accessed 13 November 2016.
23

U.S. Department of Education, Fact Sheet: Helping More American Complete

College: New Proposals for Success, released 19 January 2016, online at
http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/fact-sheet-helping-more-americans-completecollege-new-proposals-success, accessed 13 November 2016.
24

See Appendix 4.A for the derivation of equation (3).

25

Unemployment rates and earnings by educational attainment, 2016. Bureau of

Labor Statistics, online at https://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_chart_001.htm (accessed 22
March 2018).
26

Forty-five months was chosen as it represents a “four-year” stay from fall in

year one to spring in year four. A histogram of time to degree in months is presented
below which appears to support this choice.
27

As demonstrated in Brodaty et al. (2009), this assumption may be relaxed

without loss of generality.
28

See Appendix 4.B for a detailed list of which colleges fall in each category.
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29

The National Center for Education Statistics provides a standardized test score

variable in the ELS:2002 which includes all composite ACT scores and includes an
equivalent score in terms of composite ACT for students that chose to instead take the
SAT.
30

This measure was chosen because average time to degree is not available at the

institution-level in the IPEDS.
31

As one respondent told Bowen, Chingos, and McPherson (2009), graduating in

four years is like “leaving the party at 10:30pm.”
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Chapter 4:

Merit Aid Scholarships and Human Capital Production in STEM:

Evidence from New Mexico
The New Mexico Legislative Lottery Scholarship is a broad, “low-bar,” state
lottery-funded scholarship designed to increase access to higher education on behalf of
New Mexico residents. The natural experiment of a state lottery scholarship is used to
measure the effect of generous financial aid on major choice at New Mexico’s flagship
public university. A potential unintended consequence of state merit aid scholarships is
to discourage the production of human capital in science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics (STEM) fields. This may occur if students avoid more rigorous majors in
order to increase the likelihood of scholarship retention. I find no evidence that the
scholarship decreased the overall likelihood that a student first declares a STEM major or
earns a STEM degree. There are significant effects when disaggregating by academic
preparation: less-academically prepared entering freshmen are 6.8 percentage points (40
percent) less likely to initially declare a STEM major, while more-academically prepared
entering freshmen are 12.1 percentage points (44.3 percent) more likely to initially
declare a STEM major. No significant effects are found when examining whether a
STEM degree was earned. Evidence suggests these effects are at least in-part due to
compositional changes in the student body before and after the advent of the lottery
scholarship.
4.1 Introduction
The introduction of broad, merit-based college scholarships in the 1990s created a
natural experiment for measuring relationships between college costs and academic
outcomes. State merit-based scholarships generally fund most if not all tuition for
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qualified resident students. State legislation establishing merit-based scholarships share
several common goals: retaining talent in-state, increasing access to higher education by
reducing financial burdens, and promoting timely completion. There is considerable
variation in initial and continuing eligibility requirements across states. Researchers have
cataloged how such programs affect enrollment and course taking behavior, and, more
recently, degree completion. I analyze the effect of the New Mexico Legislative Lottery
Scholarship (NMLLS), a uniquely “low-bar” merit-based scholarship, on student major
choice. Specifically, this paper is interested in two related research questions. First, do
generous, low-bar merit scholarships discourage students from choosing majors in
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)? Second, do such
scholarships affect the number of STEM degrees produced?
The major focus of this paper is on the first research question. Since merit-based
scholarships require students to maintain a set level of academic achievement in order to
continue to receive aid, there are potential unintended consequences that may occur,
including dissuading students from studying more difficult subjects, including those
categorized as STEM. The consequences of this outcome may be significant to economic
interests at both the state and national levels, as STEM occupations are often seen as
major drivers of innovation, and well as key to economic growth.
Since 1993, 27 states have implemented merit-based scholarships, the first and
most studied being Georgia’s Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally, or HOPE,
scholarship program.32 HOPE marked the beginning of what has been a major
restructuring of the financial aid landscape in America. According to the College Board,
from 1993 to 2013, the percentage of total undergraduate state grant aid for which
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students’ financial circumstances were considered decreased from 90 percent to 76
percent. In the 2013-2014 academic year, New Mexico was one of 13 states where this
percentage was below 40 percent.33
We know more about the relationship between financial aid, enrollment, and
degree completion than financial aid and major choice. Different types of financial aid
have varying effects on college enrollment. Loans tend to have little to no effect, while
grants have a positive and significant effect on student enrollment (Linsenmeier et al.
2006). Students from low-income families and students of color seem to be most
responsive to such aid. Van der Klaauw (2002) demonstrates that students’ choice of
college are sensitive to financial aid offers. Several studies show a significant and
positive relationship between grant aid and student enrollment (Seftor and Turner 2002;
Kane 2003; Heller 2009) and a negative relationship between net cost and enrollment
(McPherson and Schapiro 1991). The effects of merit-based aid on enrollment have also
been well documented. In an experimental setting, Monks (2009) finds large, positive
effects of merit aid on enrollment. Studying HOPE, Dynarski (2000) finds that a $1,000
award increased student enrollment by approximately four percent. Also studying
HOPE, Cornwell et al. (2006) find the program increased student enrollment by 6
percent. In New Mexico, Binder and Ganderton (2002, 2004) find that while the NMLLS
boosted enrollment at four-year colleges in New Mexico, the effect appears to be driven
by additional enrollment of students that otherwise would have attended college out-ofstate. The effect of merit aid on college completion has also been studied.
Analyzing statewide educational attainment data, Sjoquist and Winters (2012,
2015b) found no difference in college attainment for those exposed to lottery scholarship
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programs. Using a similar methodology, Jia (2017) found that program features matter:
lower initial scholarship eligibility requirements increased two-year degree attainment,
and funding generosity increased the completion of a bachelor’s degree. Scott-Clayton
(2011) found completion effects of 9.4 percentage points (59 percent) for students just
above an ACT cut-off for West Virginia’s lottery-funded PROMISE scholarship
program, compared to students just below. Using similar strategies, Bruce and
Carruthers (2014) and Welch (2014) found no program effect for Tennessee’s lottery
scholarship. Erwin and Binder (see Chapter 2) found no overall effect of generous, lowbar merit aid on college completion. Divergent effects appeared when disaggregating the
sample by academic preparation. Less-academically prepared students appeared to
exhibit lower completion rates as a result of the scholarship while more-academically
prepared students exhibited higher completion rates, two significant effects similar in
magnitude but opposite in sign. The authors argue that changes in student composition
are potentially driving results.
I examine how the NMLLS affects STEM engagement at the University of New
Mexico (UNM) by exploring changes in 1) the likelihood of initially declaring a STEM
major and 2) the likelihood of earning a baccalaureate degree in a STEM field before and
after the implementation of the scholarship for eligible resident students and a matched
sample of nonresident (and therefore ineligible) students. Estimates reveal no significant
overall effect of the NMLLS on declaring a STEM major or earning a STEM degree.
However, there are large and statistically significant completion effects after
disaggregating by academic preparation. Academically less-prepared eligible freshmen
are 6.8 percentage points (40 percent) less likely to first declare a STEM major, while
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academically more-prepared freshmen are 12.1 percentage points (44.3 percent) more
likely to first declare a STEM major, compared to ineligible peers with similar high
school GPAs. In addition, there is evidence that some program effects may be a result of
the NMLLS inducing compositional changes in the student body.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses existing literature regarding
merit-aid and major choice, and introduces the NMLLS; Section 3 presents a theoretical
model of major choice; Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 summarizes the empirical
approach; Section 6 discusses main findings and robustness checks; Section 7 discusses
other explanations for patterns found in the results; and Section 8 concludes.
4.2 Merit aid and major choice
The natural experiment of lottery-financed merit-based aid programs provides a
promising avenue for determining the relationship between aid and major choice.
Several studies have analyzed how students sort into different majors. An early study of
this behavior can be found in Berger (1988). Berger uses a life cycle approach that
assumes students choose majors based on the expected discounted stream of future
earnings rather than beginning wages following graduation. The author provides
evidence to support this approach using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Young Men. Montmarquette et al. (2002) relax two assumptions common in previous
literature, including Berger (1988): uniform probabilities of success across majors and
constant earnings streams across majors. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth, the authors estimate the probability of success across different majors for all
students in the sample. These data are combined with estimates of predicted future
earnings in all majors from Rumberger and Thomas’s (1993) analysis of the 1987 Survey
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of Recent College Graduates, which allows the construction of a multinomial logit model
of major choice. Results suggest that one’s expected earnings stream is the most
significant factor influencing major choice, yet the probability of success is an important
factor as well. Arcidiacono et al. (2012) argues that both expected earnings and students’
perceived abilities across majors are important determinants of major choice.
Arcidiacono (2004) estimates a dynamic model of college major choice, finding
that even after controlling for selection, large earnings premiums and ability differences
still exist for some majors. Differences in monetary returns explain little of the ability
sorting across majors. Instead, Arcidiacono (2004) provides evidence that virtually all
ability sorting is due to differences in preferences for taking particular majors in college
and workplace preferences for jobs likely to be obtained after graduation, the former
being more influential than the latter. Similarly, Beffy et al. (2010) find a small, but
statistically significant, positive earnings elasticity of major choice, suggesting that
nonpecuniary factors are a large part of major choice (e.g., preferences for workload,
workplace conditions, opportunities field research, et cetera.).
Focusing on STEM fields, Wang (2013) finds that choosing a STEM major is
positively related to high school performance, as well as initial college
performance/experiences. Similarly, Griffith (2010) finds that differences in academic
preparation and educational experiences drive differences in persistence rates in STEM
majors. Wiswall and Zafar (2015) find that while expected earnings and perceived ability
play a major role in choosing STEM, unobserved tastes are the largest factor in major
choice. Henry and Rubenstein (2002) argue that merit aid may result in greater effort on
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behalf of high school students, thus better preparing students for difficult majors such as
those included in STEM.
Four studies directly examine the relationship between merit aid and major
choice. Analyzing Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship, Cornwell et al. (2006) use
administrative data to compare qualified residents and nonqualified nonresident students
in a difference-in-differences framework. The authors find that HOPE resulted in a small
1.2 percentage point increase in the likelihood that residents chose education majors,
relative to their nonresident counterparts. Cornwell et al. (2006) do not find any
meaningful change in the likelihood that students chose STEM majors due to the advent
of HOPE. Both Dynarski (2000) and Cornwell et al. (2006) find evidence that state
merit-based scholarships increase the likelihood that highly-academically prepared
students stay in-state for college, and thus affect the type and quality of institutions
attended. This implies that crowding out of moderately-academically prepared students
may occur as competition increases within more difficult majors.
Using Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System files, Zhang (2011)
examines whether Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship and Florida’s Bright Futures Scholarship
affected the likelihood that students embarked on a course of study within STEM fields.
Zhang uses differences-in-differences estimation for aggregate state data, and finds a
statistically significant 1.6 percentage point (11.4 percent) increase in the proportion of
degrees classified as STEM at private institutions in Florida, but no broader effect of
merit aid on STEM degree completion in either Florida or Georgia. Two significant
problems should be noted with this approach. Since the unveiling of such programs
affects how students sort into institutions, it is difficult to distinguish compositional
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change from real program impact (see Chapter 2, for example). Also, asymptotic
refinement should be applied in situations where there are relatively few treated units or
policy changes in a difference-in-differences framework (Conley and Taber, 2011).
Stater (2011) uses administrative data from three large public universities to
examine the relationship between tuition and financial aid on the first major a student
declares. He finds that larger net tuition results in students being more likely to choose
professional fields such as architecture, business, or law and less likely to declare majors
in humanities and sciences. Merit aid was shown to increase the likelihood of declaring
majors in humanities and sciences, while having a negative effect on social sciences. It is
difficult to view these estimates as causal, however, since Stater does not address the
endogeneity of merit aid: students that receive merit aid are better academically prepared
for college. Thus, recipients may be more likely to choose STEM majors for reasons
other than merit aid.
A recent paper regarding the relationship between merit aid and major choice
comes from Sjoquist and Winters (2015a). Their analysis relies on a difference-indifferences strategy using American Community Survey (ACS) microdata. They assign
treatment status to individuals that were 18 years of age in a state where a merit aid
program was in place, with all others assigned to the control group. Sjoquist and Winters
divide the 27 adopting states into “strong” and “weak” merit aid state categories, based
on their judgement of how broad-based programs are and how much funding they
provide. New Mexico is defined as a strong merit aid state. Findings suggest that state
merit-based scholarships reduce the rates of STEM completion. Overall, strong merit aid
programs (from 9 states) were found to reduce the number of male STEM graduates by 8
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percent, with no meaningful impact on women in the sample. The overall impact of
merit aid on the production of STEM degrees is estimated to be -6.5 percent. The authors
argue that men may be more willing to switch majors in order to retain a merit-based
scholarship. Weak merit aid programs were not found to have any effect on STEM
degree completion. There are several notable weaknesses in Sjoquist and Winters
(2015a). The authors are also not able to control for student-level characteristics, which
is important as merit aid may result in changes in student composition. Also, as noted in
Jia (2017), program features matter, and vary considerably across programs. With this in
mind, approaches which treat all state merit-aid programs as homogeneous are
problematic.
Literature on the relationship between merit aid and major choice is not in
agreement, but the most dependable studies suggest either null or negative effects on
STEM degree completion. In this study, I employ a rich administrative data set from
New Mexico’s flagship university to revisit this question and others. The main
contribution to the literature is that I control for, and disaggregate by, student-level
characteristics, which allows for more detailed insight into the effects of merit aid on
subpopulations. Cornwell at al. (2006) control for high school GPA, but do not split the
sample as I do, so it’s difficult to interpret how academic preparation impacts major
choice. I also consider how compositional changes in academic preparation of the
student body play an important role in interpreting results.
4.2.1 NMLLS program details
The NMLLS, established by the New Mexico Legislature in 1996, first became
available to students in fall 1997. New Mexico residents qualify for the NMLLS if they

91

earn a high school diploma or general educational development equivalency in New
Mexico and enroll at a public postsecondary institution in the first regular fall or spring
semester following high school graduation. Most state lottery scholarship programs
reward high school achievement and begin with the first semester of college enrollment.
In New Mexico, however, students become eligible for full tuition at any of the 16
qualified public two- or four-year colleges after they complete a full-time course load (at
least 12 credits) with a 2.5 GPA or higher in their first college semester. To encourage
students to try for the scholarship, New Mexico colleges offer students “Bridge to
Success” scholarships which completely or mostly offset tuition in their first semester. In
the period examined, students could receive the award for up to eight semesters, provided
they enroll full-time, continuously, and maintained a cumulative 2.5 GPA. Only 58
percent of first semester students over 1994-1999 met NMLLS requirements, and only 30
percent remained eligible at the end of their second year.
Before the NMLLS, New Mexico nearly exclusively awarded financial aid based
on need. According to a 1994 National Association of State Student Grant & Aid
Programs report, New Mexico devoted an average of $222 per full-time equivalent (FTE)
undergraduate student in financial aid in the 1993-1994 academic year. Of the $222 total
per FTE, only $3 (1.4 percent) was merit-based. By contrast, in 2000, New Mexico
allocated $687 per undergraduate FTE, with $368 (54 percent) being merit-based. It
appears the NMLLS not only supplemented rather than supplanted student aid, but
drastically changed the student aid landscape throughout the state.
Compared to states with similar programs, NMLLS eligibility requirements are
relatively “low-bar.” For example, Georgia’s HOPE scholarship requires students to
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graduate high school with a 3.0 cumulative GPA and maintain a 3.0 GPA in college. 34
Eligibility for Tennessee’s HOPE scholarship requires minimum ACT/SAT scores in
addition to the 3.0 high school GPA requirement. Renewal requires a 2.75 minimum
overall GPA after attempting 24 and 48 credit hours, and requires a 3.0 minimum overall
GPA at 72- and 96-credit hour reviews. 35 Florida’s Bright Futures Scholarship has three
levels of merit-based awards, each with varying high school GPA, standardized test
scores, and community service requirements.36
If financial constraints are binding for students, then the NMLLS should have the
desired effect of increasing access to higher education and boosting resident enrollment.
However, due to low-bar initial and ongoing scholarship qualifications of the NMLLS,
much of the increase in resident enrollment may be on behalf of less-academically
prepared students who otherwise would have enrolled at a less prestigious university, a
two-year program at a community college, or perhaps not have enrolled in college at all.
With price signals in the market for higher education removed, some students may
choose to embark on a more prestigious, yet riskier, academic path—one that maximizes
the “worth” of the scholarship (i.e., that which covers the largest cost). 37 Because the
NMLLS is structured so that students lose the scholarship permanently if they fail to meet
renewal requirements in any semester, some students may respond to merit aid by
choosing easier majors which improve their chances of scholarship retention. In this
case, the NMLLS could have the unintended consequence of decreasing the proportion of
students choosing and ultimately completing degrees in STEM fields. However, as
discussed above, renewal requirements for the NMLLS are relatively low. If students
expect their probabilities of success in STEM majors are sufficiently to satisfy eligibility
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criteria then students may not avoid pursuing majors in STEM. The direction of any
estimated program effects relies heavily on the academic preparation of resident students
before and after the introduction of the NMLLS, and is ultimately an empirical question.
Composition of the student body at UNM is discussed in detail below.
4.3 Merit aid and major choice
Students’ choice of college major are modeled using a modified life-cycle
approach developed by Montmarquette et al. (2002). This approach holds that students
choose college majors so as to maximize lifetime utility, which depends on expected
earnings and the likelihood of merit scholarship retainment. For simplicity, assume that
students who are able to retain merit aid ultimately graduate with a bachelor’s degree.
Let pij be the likelihood of scholarship retainment for student i in major j. The expected
lifetime utility for student i choosing major j, E(Uij), is a function of predicted future
earnings so that:
(1)

𝐸(𝑈 ) = 𝑝 (𝑿)𝑒 (𝒁) + 1 − 𝑝 (𝑿) 𝑒 (𝒁), 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁; 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚,

where X includes factors influencing the probability of retaining the scholarship,
including academic preparation. The vector Z includes factors affecting earnings after
college. eij are the discounted value of lifetime earnings after completing a degree in
major j and ei0 are discounted value of lifetime earnings after losing the scholarship and
dropping out of college without a degree. Students will choose major j over major k
whenever E(Uij) ≥ E(Uik) for all k ≠ j, or whenever,
(2)

𝑝 (𝑿) 𝑒 (𝒁) − 𝑒 (𝒁) + 𝑝 (𝑿) − 𝑝 (𝑿) [𝑒 (𝒁) − 𝑒 (𝒁)] ≥ 0.

According to equation (2), if the likelihoods of retaining merit aid differ
substantially across majors, and lifetime earnings differences across majors are relatively
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small, then success probabilities will play a major role in major choice. If likelihoods of
scholarship retainment are approximately the same, then expected earnings will be the
major driver in the choice of major. Thus, one would expect highly-academically
prepared students, whose likelihoods of retaining the merit scholarship are high across all
majors, to be more likely to choose majors based on which has the highest expected
return (i.e., STEM).38 For less-academically prepared students, I assume the likelihood
of retaining the merit scholarship is lower for some majors relative to others, thus these
students choose majors primarily on the basis of success probabilities, and choose majors
which are less difficult. Importantly, this simplified model does not account for tastes
and preferences of students, which the literature has indicated plays an important role in
major choice (Arcidiacono, 2004; Beffy et al., 2010; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015).
In the context of whether broad, low-bar merit scholarships such as the NMLLS
affect student major, the theoretical framework above suggests that more-academically
prepared students will tend to embark on more difficult, higher-paying majors such as
those in STEM fields, while less-academically prepared students will tend to avoid such
majors in favor of less-difficult majors, such as those within education and the liberal
arts, for example.
4.4 Data set
The analysis uses administrative data for all first-time, full-time entering
freshmen at UNM before and after the implementation of the NMLLS to estimate effects
on major choice. UNM enrolls over 20,000 students each year in the City of
Albuquerque, the largest metropolitan area of the state with over 500,000 residents.
UNM is nearly an open-enrollment institution. Data include socio-demographic
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information (age, race, ethnicity, gender, family income, declined to state race-ethnicity),
high school academic performance (high school GPA, standardized test scores, indication
of remedial coursework at UNM), and college academic outcomes by semester (credits
earned, declared major, college GPA, date of graduation). Majors are categorized into
five areas using ACS definitions: STEM, liberal arts, education, business, social science,
and health-related.39 I also consider alternative definitions provided by UNM as a
robustness check. Data are complete with the exception of family income and high
school GPA. The data set only contains family income for FAFSA-filers, constituting 51
percent of the sample. For those that did not submit a FAFSA, it is assumed their family
income is sufficiently high (i.e., ≥ $40,000) as to not qualify for the Federal Pell Grant
Program. This assumption is supported by a 1995-1996 Federal Pell Grant End-of-Year
Report showing that less than two percent of Pell recipients had family income in excess
of $40,000.40 This assumption is not perfect. King (2004) estimates that in 2000 over ten
percent of all Pell-eligible students did not file a FAFSA. 41 If the analysis in King (2004)
holds for our data set, then there would exist systematic measurement bias in the family
income variable—some lower income students would be incorrectly placed in the higher
income category. High school GPA is missing for home-schooled students, a small
portion of matriculating students at UNM. For these students, they are assigned the mean
high school GPA of 3.28.
Models concentrate on the years 1994 to 1999, bounding the policy change by
three years before and after implementation. These years encompass the largest
economic expansion in the U.S. since World War II. During this period labor market
conditions in New Mexico were gradually tightening but remained relatively stable, so
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one needs not to worry much that broad economic conditions are driving results. To my
knowledge, there were no concurrent policy changes at the high school or postsecondary
level in New Mexico over the 1994-1999 period which would have differentially
impacted enrollment and/or major choice for residents and nonresidents.
In preferred specifications, recent high school graduates from New Mexico (who
are NMLLS eligible) are compared with those from out of state (who are not eligible, but
experience the same campus environment), while excluding foreign students.
Table 4.2 compares summary statistics for resident and nonresident students
before and after the implementation of the NMLLS. It appears the composition of these
groups changed across pre- and post-treatment periods. In years before the
implementation of the NMLLS, resident students had higher high school GPAs and ACT
composite scores compared to years following the implementation of the scholarship.
Moreover, students matriculating after implementation were more likely to take remedial
coursework at UNM. These changes are statistically significant, suggesting that the
NMLLS may have induced students with weaker academic preparation to enroll at UNM.
Table 4.2 also shows that residents were less likely to come from lower-income families
following implementation of the NMLLS, another indication of a compositional effect.
The academic achievement of nonresident students improved following implementation
of the scholarship, according to HSGPA and composite ACT scores. Also note the
statistically significant decline in resident students initially declaring a STEM major—a
decline not seen in the nonresident group. Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics for
those earning a degree at UNM during the study period. Note there is less evidence of a
compositional change in resident students, with only a small decline in high school GPA.
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For degree earning residents, there is no descriptive evidence of a decline in STEM
degree production after the initiation of the NMLLS.
Although several statistically significant differences exist between resident and
nonresident students in terms of high school GPA, composite ACT scores, remedial
coursework, family income, race, and ethnicity, this does not threaten the validity of our
difference-in-differences model of STEM engagement if the common trends assumption
holds. The identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences model is that pretreatment trends in the outcome variable be similar in trajectory across treatment and
control groups. As a visual check of this identifying assumption, Figure 4.1 presents pretreatment trends in the likelihood of declaring a first major in STEM for residents and
nonresidents between 1994 and 1999. Visual inspection supports the validity of a
difference-in-differences identification strategy examining six-year graduation rates.
Figure 4.2 presents pre-treatment trends in the likelihood of earning a STEM degree for
residents and nonresidents over the same time period. Because completion rates at UNM
are relatively low, there are far fewer observations for this group and consequently the
graph is quite noisy, especially for nonresidents who are greatly outnumbered by resident
students at UNM (by nearly 11 times over). Although Figure 4.1 seems reasonably
comparable before the NMLLS was launched in 1997, Figure 4.2 does not pass visual
inspection. An empirical test of the common trends assumption is conducted following
Autor (2003). Autor suggests estimating flexible difference-in-differences models by
interacting the resident dummy variable with cohort dummy variables, producing a model
allowing for treatment at different time periods. This model can be expressed as
(3) 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑀 ) = 𝛾 + 𝜆 + ∑
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𝛽 𝐷 (𝑡 = 𝑘 + 𝑗) + 𝑋 𝛿 + 𝜀

where i denotes the student, s denotes residency status, and t denotes cohort year. The
variable Dst is the binary treatment indicator and k is the year which the treatment started
(k = 1997 in this case). Xist contains controls for race, ethnicity, gender, family income,
remedial coursework in college, high school GPA, and standardized test scores. Models
report robust standard errors. In equation (3), m and q are the number of leads and lags of
the treatment effect included. Two leads and three lags are included in the test, defining
1999 as the reference cohort.
Testing the common trends assumption using (3) requires examining whether
(4) 𝛽 = 0 ∀𝑗 < 0.
In other words, the common trends assumption holds when the coefficients on all
leads of the treatment are zero. This specification can also have the advantage of
informing whether estimated treatment effects occur in multiple post-treatment time
periods, fade away with time, or remain constant, for example. Tests are conducted for
the two STEM outcomes using ordinary least squares and results are presented in
Appendix A. Results provide evidence that the common trends assumption holds for all
specifications, as estimated coefficients on all leads are not statistically different from
zero.
Data include 10,022 resident students, 6,307 of which enrolled during the postNMLLS period and were eligible for the Bridge to Success Scholarship. Of these, 2,664
met cumulative GPA and credit attainment requirements to begin the NMLLS in their
second semester. Table 4.4 documents the number of students that maintain the
scholarship in the second through ninth semester. It is apparent scholarship loss was
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quite common. Of the 2,664 students that qualified for the NMLLS, approximately 30
percent were still eligible for the NMLLS going into their third year.
4.5 Empirical model
Difference-in-differences matching estimation on the propensity score is
conducted to mitigate any observable differences between resident and nonresident
students. The approach uses kernel matching, a one-to-many matching technique
assigning larger weights to control units closer in propensity score. The general form of
the matching estimator is given by

(5)

∆

=

1
𝑛

−

1
𝑛
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−
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−
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∩

where n1t, n1t’ are the number of treated cases before and after the inception of the
NMLLS, Sp is the common support region, and I0t, I0t’, I1t, I1t’ are the resident and
nonresident groups before and after the NMLLS. Major choice outcomes for resident and
nonresident students are given by Y1t, Y0t, Y1t’, Y0t’. The function w(i, j) denotes the
weight given to j𝑡ℎ case, where ∑ 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) = 1 and 0 < 𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) < 1. The weighting
function w(i, j) is given by
(6)

𝑤(𝑖, 𝑗) =

𝐾 𝑙 𝑥 − 𝑙 (𝑥 )
∑

∈

∩

𝐾 𝑙 𝑥 − 𝑙 (𝑥 )

where K is the Epanechnikov kernel function and 𝑙 (⋅) ≡ ln

(⋅)
(⋅)

is the fitted linearized

propensity score from a logistic regression model estimated by maximum likelihood.
Linearized propensity scores are used as they are more likely to have a distribution that is
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approximately normal. Treatment effects, ∆

, are calculated using kernel-weighted

least squares according to equation (6). Robust standard errors are reported. The
propensity score model includes all covariates in levels, as well as several quadratic
terms.42 Results of the propensity score model are presented in Table 4.5. It is important
to note that while the propensity score model may seem awkward in that it predicts the
immutable condition of being a New Mexico resident, it is not essential that the
propensity score model have a meaningful interpretation. Instead, the validity of the
propensity score model rests on how well it balances covariates across treatment and
control groups (Imbens and Rubin, 2015; Imbens, 2015).
Having a small group of nonresident students relative to resident students has
implications for the estimates. In order to increase the precision of estimated treatment
effects, and to avoid imposing functional form where possible, kernel density matching is
chosen.43 This method has the advantage of lower variance since more information is
used. On the other hand, it may result in an increase in bias due to the potential for
considering “bad” matches. Although the further the observations are in terms of
propensity score, the less weight is given to the potential bad match, this makes adequate
overlap a necessary condition for the validity of this method.
In our analysis, matching is limited to those individuals whose propensity scores
lie in the common support region, which is over 99.5 percent of the original sample. No
observations are trimmed from the analysis. As a sensitivity analysis, effects are
estimated using various fixed bandwidths, h, in the kernel function. Importantly, the
choice of bandwidth also involves a bias-variance trade-off. Smaller bandwidths
consider a smaller portion of the pool of control observations, and thus use less
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information, which tends to reduce bias (from being less likely to consider poor matches)
while increasing sampling variance. In order to assess the effectiveness of the matching
procedure, several tests are conducted following Imbens and Rubin (2015), although they
are modified for difference-in-differences matching with repeated cross sections. An
explanation of these tests and their results are presented in the appendices to chapter 2.
In addition to estimating the overall effect of the NMLLS, I am also interested
whether program effects differ depending on academic preparation. This is explored by
estimating separate models on students above and below the mean high school GPA. 44
Robustness checks using various STEM definitions, cohorts, and smoothing parameters
are discussed in Section 6.1.
While difference-in-differences models hinge on the comparability of pretreatment trends in outcomes across residents and nonresidents, combining difference-indifferences methods with propensity score matching controls for compositional changes
in groups over time (Stuart et al. 2014). It is also worth noting that regressions control
for high school achievement and standardized test scores, the main indication of
compositional change. Also, because UNM is a de facto open enrollment institution,
changes in selectivity are not likely to confound the analysis (Binder and Ganderton,
2004). It is clear that compositional change in the student body occurred, yet this does
not diminish the validity of treatment effects estimated.
4.6 Results
Means and normalized differences after kernel matching are presented in Table
4.6. Comparing means before and after the NMLLS, it appears that the matching
algorithm performed well in balancing covariates. Normalized differences for pre- and
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post-NMLLS periods are near zero, with the largest normalized difference (-.122) far
below one-quarter of a standard deviation unit in absolute value. These statistics are
produced by academic preparation as well, revealing a similar pattern, although
differences were slightly higher when considering students more than one standard
deviation above the mean high school GPA. Overall, normalized differences suggest
excellent balance in covariates following kernel matching.
Table 4.7 presents results of the difference-in-differences kernel matching
estimation. Results provide no evidence of an overall effect on either first declaring a
STEM major or earning a STEM degree. Furthermore, there is no evidence suggesting
the NMLLS had an impact on earned STEM degrees when the sample is disaggregated
by academic preparation. Considering students’ decisions to first declare a major in
STEM, there appears to be a divergent effect: students with below average academic
preparation are 6.8 percentage points (40 percent) less likely to declare their first major to
be in a STEM field, while those with above-average academic preparation are 12.1
percentage points (44.3 percent) more likely to declare a first major in STEM. Effects
are significant at ten and one percent-levels, respectively. These divergent effects mask
any overall program effect of the NMLLS on declaring a first major in STEM.
In summary, results reveal no meaningful impact on first declaring a STEM major
or earning a STEM degree in the aggregate. In terms of declaring an initial major in
STEM, I find that less-academically prepared students are averse to doing so.
Conversely, I find that more-academically prepared students declare initial majors in
STEM at higher rates compared to their nonresident counterparts as a result of the
scholarship.
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4.6.1 Alternative STEM definitions, smoothing parameters, and freshmen cohorts
Robustness checks are conducted to examine the sensitivity of results to various
assumptions. Appendix 4.C offers three different definitions of STEM based on the
student’s major. Table 4.C1 presents STEM majors from the ACS, our preferred
categorization scheme. We prefer this set of STEM majors as it was developed by the
U.S. Census Bureau, is sufficiently narrow in scope, and is the most comprehensive list
that can be found. Further, it is employed by previous literature which we are keen to
compare our results to (Sjoquist and Winters, 2015a). Tables 4.C2 and 4.C3 present
alternative lists of STEM majors compiled by the STEM Collaborative Center (SCC) at
UNM. Table C2 presents the “broad” list of STEM majors compiled by SCC while 4.C3
presents the “narrow” version. The broad list is problematic because it includes many
majors which one may not agree qualify as being designated as STEM, including
anthropology, economics, geography, and nursing. The narrow list should be a subset of
the broad list put out by SCC, yet it is not. For example, the narrow list includes statistics
while the broad list does not. I nonetheless run models of STEM major declaration and
STEM degree completion using broad and narrow lists from SCC. Appendix 4.D
displays results of these regressions.
Table 4.D1 presents estimates using the narrow STEM definition provided by the
SCC. Aggregate results and those disaggregated by academic preparation are shown. In
general, point estimates are similar to our preferred results using the ACS definition, but
are attenuated in both magnitude and statistical significance. Using the narrow definition,
the point estimate for first majoring in STEM for less-academically prepared students
remains negative, but is no longer precisely estimated. The point estimate for first

104

majoring in STEM for more-academically prepared students is still positive, yet the
magnitude is smaller and it achieves statistical significance at a lower level. Table 4.D3
is structured just as other results tables, but employs the broad list from SCC. One would
expect the broader scope of this definition to result in further attenuation in terms of
magnitude and statistical significance, which it does with one exception. Results using
the broad definition estimate a large statistically significant decline in STEM major
declaration for the most-academically prepared entering freshmen, although the point
estimate is significant only at the ten percent-level.
In addition to examining the sensitivity of results to various definitions of STEM,
it is also imperative to examine whether results are sensitive to the choice of smoothing
parameter used in the kernel matching procedure. Appendix 4.E presents such sensitivity
tests. According to test performed in Appendix 4.B, the matching procedure performed
remarkably well. This is further evidenced by Table 4.E1 where one notes that only a
few additional observations are included when increasing the bandwidth from 0.1 to 0.3.
Point estimates using bandwidths of h = {0.1, 0.2, 0.3} are remarkably close in
magnitude and statistical significance. There are no sign changes when varying the
bandwidth across these values. This provides evidence that bandwidth choice is not a
significant driver of our main results presented in Table 4.7.
Appendix 4.F presents results using different sets of freshmen cohorts. Although
a bit noisier than robustness checks using alternative bandwidths, we see a similar pattern
of completion rates emerge as compared to our preferred specification. Some
coefficients become imprecisely estimated when including either the 1993 cohort, the
2000 cohort, or both.
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4.6.2 Compositional effects
Key results from Section 6 are not entirely in agreement with the most thorough
treatment of this subject to date. Estimates in this paper reveal no meaningful effect of
the NMLLS on the likelihood that students earn degrees in STEM fields, in contrast to
Sjoquist and Winters (2015a). However, results also provide no evidence that merit aid
decreases students’ likelihoods of majoring in STEM, in agreement with Cornwell et al.
(2006). Further, estimates provide evidence of negative STEM degree effects for men,
with no statistically meaningful effects for women in the sample, in-line with findings in
Sjoquist and Winters (2015a).45 It is valuable to entertain compositional effects as an
alternative hypothesis for the results obtained.
The NMLLS was designed to increase access to higher education for resident
students, which it certainly did. According to Table 4.2, the post-NMLLS period of the
sample showed a resident population increase of 70 percent (with a much smaller 11
percent increase in nonresidents). After the NMLLS was introduced, however, resident
high school GPAs and standardized test scores fell significantly, and resident students
were required to take more remedial courses at UNM. This apparent change in student
composition is likely key to interpreting much of the results found in Table 4.7.
According to the theoretical model presented in Section 4.3, academically marginally
prepared students are likely to respond to merit aid by choosing majors for which their
probability of success is higher. This may explain why results show that lessacademically prepared students majored in STEM significantly less in response to the
NMLLS. On the other hand, theory predicts that more-academically prepared students
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have high probabilities of success in all majors, and so are likely to choose majors with
higher expected lifetime earnings, such as STEM.
4.7 Conclusions
I examine the effect of an exceptionally generous and low-bar merit-based
scholarship on intitially declaring a major in STEM and ultimately earning a degree in
STEM. Variants of the difference-in-differences model are estimated using qualified
resident students as the treatment group and a matched sample of ineligible nonresident
students as the control group. The common trends assumption is supported empirically.
The sample is stratified by academic preparation and gender to see which, if any,
subgroups are driving completion effects. Kernel matching is conducted and its success
is examined through rigorous statistical testing. A flexible difference-in-differences
model is estimated to verify that program effects are limited to treatment years.
Sensitivity to cohorts included as well as the smoothing parameter used in the matching
alogirthm are reported. Additionally, I use alternative definitions of STEM, finding
similar patterns in results that are attenauted in magnitude and significance-level.
Results reveal find no meaningful program effects in terms of declaring a STEM
major or earning a STEM degree in the aggregate. As per declaring an initial major in
STEM, less-academically prepared students are more likely to declare a non-STEM
major, an effect that appears to be driven by women. Conversely, I find that moreacademically prepared students declare initial majors in STEM at higher rates compared
to their nonresident counterparts as a result of the scholarship, an effect that is again
driven by women at UNM. These effects are similar in magnitude but opposite in sign,
masking any program effect in the aggregate.
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In motivating the paper, two main research questions were proposed. First, do
generous, low-bar merit scholarships discourage students from choosing majors in
STEM? Results suggest the answer is “no” in the aggregate, but “yes” on behalf of lessacademically prepared students. Moreover, such programs may actually increase interest
in STEM majors on behalf of well-academically prepared students. Second, do
scholarships such as the NMLLS affect the number of STEM degrees produced? The
answer is a resounding “no” according to my results.
The main conclusion we can draw from the analysis is that low-bar merit-based
scholarships neither increase nor decrease the production of STEM degrees. I find little
evidence that merit aid eligibility requirements result in students pursuing easier, nonSTEM course of study. Although overall production of STEM degrees is not affected by
such scholarships, they may alter the composition of who majors in STEM and who
eventually completes a STEM degree. To my knowledge, no other studies have looked at
merit aid and STEM degree production by high- and low-achieving students. We find a
divergent effect of the NMLLS on major choice, in accordance with the theoretical model
posed by Montmarquette et al. (2002): more-academically prepared students are more
likely to declare a major in STEM, while less-academically prepared students are less
likely to do so.
Since its inception in 1997, the NMLLS has seen significant changes. Starting in
the 2014-2015 academic year, the scholarship was capped at seven semesters (plus the
initial bridging semester) and initial and renewal credit requirements were increased from
12 to 15 credits earned per semester. A statewide budget crisis in 2017 resulted in the
legislature making major cuts to the NMLLS—whereas the scholarship paid 100 percent
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of tuition over our study period, the program only covers approximately 60 percent of
tuition as of the 2017-2018 academic year. The 2017 Regular Session saw the passage of
SB 420, which allows students to take a “gap” year after high school and still remain
eligible for the NMLLS. It is not clear how recent program changes will affect student
choice of major at UNM.
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Note: The plot above show the likelihood of declaring the first major in STEM for
incoming cohorts over the period 1994 to 1999. Solid lines represent resident
students while dashed lines represent nonresident students. The vertical bars at
1997 mark the implementation of the New Mexico Legislative Lottery Scholarship.
Figure 4.1 Pre-post trends in the likelihood of declaring first major in STEM, by
residency
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Note: The plot above show the likelihood of declaring the first major in STEM for
incoming cohorts over the period 1994 to 1999. Solid lines represent resident
students while dashed lines represent nonresident students. The vertical bars at
1997 mark the implementation of the New Mexico Legislative Lottery Scholarship.
Figure 4.2 Pre-post trends in the likelihood of earning a degree in STEM, by residency
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Table 4.1 Full-time resident tuition at all NMLLS-eligible institutions

Institution
New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology
University of New Mexico
New Mexico State University
Western New Mexico University
Eastern New Mexico University
New Mexico Highlands University
New Mexico Military Institute
Northern New Mexico College
Mesalands Community College
San Juan College
Central New Mexico Community College
Clovis Community College
Santa Fe Community College
New Mexico Junior College
Luna Community College
Southwestern Indian Polytechnic Institute

Program Length
(years)
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

Tuition
and Fees
7,000
6,950
6,729
6,644
5,630
5,550
5,179
5,112
1,990
1,773
1,340
1,324
1,196
1,158
968
730

Source: Institution financial aid department websites. Accessed 28 March 2017.
Figures present tuition and fees for one academic year taking fifteen credit hours per
semester. For two-year schools it is assumed the student is within the community
college district, where applicable.
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Table 4.2 Student characteristics before and after initiation of the NMLLS program, first
major declared, ACS major codes
Before

Residents
After Diff.

First Major Declared:
STEM
Liberal Arts
Education
Business
Social Science

.236
0.158
.074
0.075
.110

0.221
0.184
0.101
0.094
0.101

-.015*
.026***
.027***
.019***
-0.009

.179
0.206
.061
0.065
.112

0.151 -0.026
0.237
0.031
0.088 .027*
0.071
0.006
0.122
0.01

Health-Related

0.133

0.114 -.019***

0.121

0.083 -.038**

Never Declared

0.214

0.183 -.031***

0.256

0.248

3.312

3.273 -.038***

3.233

Variable

HSGPA

-0.502
ACT

22.53
-3.834

Remedial
Income < $40K

Nonresidents
Before
After Diff.

-0.008

3.3 .067**

-0.471

-0.532

-0.503

22.176 -.354***

22.317

22.861 .544**

-3.887

-4.109

-4.096

0.264

0.29 .026***

0.164

0.227 .063***

0.23

0.205 -.025***

0.155

0.162

0.007

Female

0.571

0.565

-0.006

0.526

0.545

0.019

Hispanic

0.386

0.375

-0.011

0.147

0.166

0.02

Native

0.043

0.045

0.002

0.041

0.051

0.01

Asian

0.047

0.037 -.010**

0.034

0.026

-0.008

Black
Observations

0.021
3,715

0.022
6,307

0.082
587

0.08
649

-0.002

0.002

Source: Freshmen Tracking System, Office of Institutional Analytics, UNM.
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent-levels,
respectively. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 4.3 Student characteristics before and after initiation of the NMLLS program,
degree type earned, ACS major codes
Variable
Degree Type Earned:
STEM
Liberal Arts
Education
Business
Social Science
Health-Related

Residents
Before
After Diff.

.253
0.262

0.24
0.249

.116

0.081

0.157
.167
0.044

Nonresidents
Before
After Diff.

-0.013
-0.013

.035***
0.19 .033***
0.177
0.01
0.064 .020***

HSGPA

3.479
-0.467

3.455 -.024*
-0.439

ACT

23.268
-3.761

23.085
-3.784

Remedial

0.192

0.196

Income < $40K

0.194

0.173 -.021*

Female

0.616

0.616

Hispanic

0.366

Native

.173
0.341

0.195
0.326

0.022
-0.015

.121

0.026 -.095***

0.185
.145
0.035

0.163 -0.022
0.237 .092**
0.053
0.018

3.483
-0.46

3.473
-0.442

-0.01

-0.183

23.526
-3.865

23.807
-3.888

0.281

0.004

0.138

0.15

0.012

0.128

0.14

0.012

0

0.622

0.609

-0.013

0.358

-0.008

0.097

0.159 .062*

0.022

0.023

0.001

0.01

0.039 .029*

Asian

0.052

0.041 -.011*

0.041

0.019

-0.021

Black
Observations

0.016
1,547

0.018
2,543

0.102
173

0.058
190

-0.044

0.002

Source: Freshmen Tracking System, Office of Institutional Analytics, UNM.
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent-levels,
respectively. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Table 4.4 NMLLS student attrition, 1994-1999
Semester

Residents Eligible

Percent Remaining

2

2,664

100.0%

3

2,249

84.4%

4

2,017

75.7%

5

1,863

69.9%

6

1,734

65.1%

7

1,629

61.1%

8

1,568

58.9%

9
1,510
56.7%
Source: Office of Institutional Analytics, University of New
Mexico. We consider the sample of resident students that met
cumulative GPA and credit requirements in their first semester to
qualify for the NMLLS.
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Table 4.5 Estimated parameters for propensity score model of NMLLS data, 1994-1999
Variable

Estimate

Std. Error

HSGPA
ACT
Remedial
Income < 20K
Income < 40K
Female
Hispanic
Native American
Asian
Black
Declined to state race-ethnicity
ACT2
ACT*Black
Female*White
HSGPA2
ACT*Female
ACT*HSGPA
Remedial*Asian
GPA*Black
ACT*Native
Female*Native
HSGPA*Hispanic

1.729**
.498***
.891***
.268*
.160
1.670***
1.865***
1.884**
.032
-5.729***
-.108
-.013***
.141***
-.571***
-.461***
-.053***
.059***
1.147**
.546
-.082**
-.608*
-.312*

.724
.090
.118
.158
.108
.367
.550
.923
.207
1.155
.282
.002
.045
.146
.116
.016
.020
.505
.339
.041
.317
.165

Constant

-7.711***

1.600

Observations

11,258

Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * correspond to
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels,
respectively. Propensity scores are estimated using a logistic
model. Forty-nine observations were dropped following estimation
of the propensity score to ensure overlap, leaving 11,209
observations. The variable Declined to state race-ethnicity is equal
to one if the student declined to state their race-ethnicity, and zero
otherwise.
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Table 4.6: Means and normalized differences after kernel matching, full sample, 19941999

Variable

Res.

Pre-NMLLS
Nonres.

ND

Post-NMLLS
Res.
Nonres.

HS GPA

3.31

3.27

0.088

3.27

3.33

-0.122

Composite ACT

22.56

22.37

0.047

22.19

22.58

-0.099

Remedial

0.26

0.24

0.032

0.29

0.28

0.012

Income < $40,000

0.22

0.21

0.04

0.2

0.21

-0.032

Female

0.57

0.58

-0.009

0.56

0.59

-0.063

Hispanic

0.39

0.39

-0.019

0.37

0.36

0.025

Native

0.04

0.04

0.001

0.05

0.05

-0.03

Asian

0.04

0.03

0.058

0.04

0.03

0.019

Black

0.02

0.02

-0.023

0.02

0.02

0.018

ND

Means are from Epanechnikov kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2.
Normalized differences (ND) are calculated by taking the difference average covariate
values by residency status and dividing by a measure of standard deviation.
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Table 4.7 NMLLS and major choice by academic preparation, American Community
Survey definition, 1994-1999
Group
Full Sample

Obs.
11,209

5,473

5,734

𝑌

.026
(.030)

4,438

-.012
(.057)

-.068*
(.040)

.240
1,507

.121***
(.046)

2,105

-.063
(.067)
.334

.147
(.093)
.145

2,930

.273

𝑌
HSGPA > 3.78

Majored in STEM

.170

𝑌
HSGPA > 3.28

Obs.

.221

𝑌
HSGPA ≤ 3.28

First Declared STEM

-.051
(.073)
.291

1,271

-.061
(.119)
.386

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from
difference-in-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using
the Epanechnikov kernel function. We report estimates for students with below
average or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (>
3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (>
3.78). 𝑌 denotes the baseline rate of STEM major choice by academic preparation.
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added to the “baseline” model and the process repeated until all remaining likelihood
ratio statistics are below the threshold of 2.71.
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121

Chapter 5:

Conclusions: How students respond to merit aid and how employers

react to lengthened time to degree

The work in this dissertation focuses on two major issues germane to the market
for higher education: the changing structure of financial aid in the United States and the
changing paradigm of time to degree. The advent of state merit-based scholarships in the
U.S. has changed students’ college-going decisions, as well as their choices while in
college. While good intentions belie these programs, do such scholarships help or hinder
a student’s ability to complete college? Do they affect the academic trajectory of the
student, ultimately affecting their career path? Chapters 2 and 4 address this issue
directly. The longstanding trend of taking longer to complete a baccalaureate degree is
also at question. How long is too long? Do employers entertain this variable when
making job offers? Chapter 3 addresses this issue. I summarize the main findings,
limitations, and policy implications of each essay in turn.
In chapter two, “Does Broad-Based Merit Aid Improve College Completion?
Evidence from New Mexico's Lottery Scholarship,” we investigate whether broad-based
merit aid results in any meaningful change in college completion rates. Surprisingly, we
find that merit aid, as it is structured in New Mexico, results in some students being less
likely to graduate, with others being more likely to graduate. This divide hinges on
academic preparation. Although completion rates are unaffected in the aggregate, we
provide evidence that such scholarships result in meaningful changes in student
composition. With low initial eligibility criteria, students appear to utilize the scholarship
at the university providing the highest expected return on to degree, often corresponding
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to the flagship university or the university with the highest cost of attendance. Low-bar
scholarships generous in funding may promote overmatching, which occurs when a
student attends an institution for which they are academically underprepared. We find
that low-achieving high school students that acquire such scholarships are less likely to
complete their studies. Conversely, students that perform well in high school are more
likely to complete. What is the best solution to increasing access to higher education at
the state-level? Not surprising to economists, it appears that broad-based merit-aid
scholarships have both costs and benefits to recipients. The trade-off focuses is one
between access and completion: broad-based merit scholarships significantly increase
access to higher education, yet they distort the choice of where to go, and may harm the
marginally prepared student seeking out the highest return. Disaggregating results by
family income suggests that program effects are likely driven by students from lowincome households. Because the NMLLS has had many difficulties regarding solvency
over the years, we recommend that a need-based component to the scholarship be
considered. Additionally, researchers would like to have data on the entire postsecondary
system in New Mexico, which would allow for a richer analysis of compositional change
as a result of such scholarships.
In chapter three, “Wage Effects of Baccalaureate Time to Degree in the United
States,” we examine whether how long an undergraduate student spends obtaining a
degree matters to employers after college. Using a nationally-representative longitudinal
study of high school students, we develop a test of whether longer time to degree serves
as a negative productivity signal. Previous literature estimates that each additional year
beyond the four-year mark results in up to an eight percent wage penalty. Being skeptics,
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and assuming that college students are rational actors in the economy, we test this
hypothesis ourselves. The major problem with previous literature is that time to degree is
endogenous in the earnings equation. That is, there are several factors which may both
affect time to degree and earnings, such as student ability, college quality, for example,
and unobservable factors that impact how long a student typically graduates at a given
college. We confront this endogeneity by controlling for student ability (vis-à-vis
standardized test scores), institution quality (vis-à-vis Barron’s Admissions
Competitiveness data), and instrumenting the student’s time to degree by the average at
their institution. The instrument appears to be relevant and exogenous. Without using
instrumental variables techniques, we are able to mimic the large and significant wage
penalties found in previous studies. However, after controlling for the above and using
instrumental variables, results suggest that time to degree is not taken as a productivity
signal, and there is no wage penalty associated with lengthened time to degree. Results
provide fodder to arguments that punishing prolonged time to degree is a waste of
resources. Indeed, we offer theoretical and empirical evidence showing that rational,
utility-maximizing students may prefer to earn a degree and work part-time
simultaneously over six years, rather than foregoing work and completing a degree in
four years.
In chapter four, “Merit Aid Scholarships and Human Capital Production in
STEM: Evidence from New Mexico,” I examine whether merit based aid dissuades
students from studying more difficult subjects, such as STEM. The advent of state merit
aid scholarships begs the question: do students respond by avoiding more difficult
majors, such as those in STEM? I again utilize the rich administrative data set provided
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by UNM (same as chapter two). Using the same matching algorithm, which appears to
have been successful, I estimate whether students are more- or less-STEM averse after
receiving the scholarship. Using two different outcomes related to studying STEM
(declaring a first major in STEM and earning a degree in STEM), I find that there is no
meaningful impact of the NMLLS in the aggregate. However, there does appear to be a
divergent effect when disaggregating by academic preparation, as proxied by one’s high
school performance. High achieving students seem to study more STEM in response to
merit aid, while low-achieving student have an opposite reaction. This is in line with the
theoretical literature. Results suggest that adopting or killing state merit aid scholarships
will not affect degree production in STEM, although it may change the composition of
those earning it in terms of academic preparation and gender.
This work is by no means a comprehensive study relating to the relationship
between state merit aid student outcomes. In fact, it only scratches the surface. We
provide evidence of the costs and benefits of such aid, but implore universities and state
governments to make more data available, so that we may make more informed decisions
regarding the trade-off between accessibility to higher education and student success.
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Appendices to Chapter 2
Appendix 2.A Assessing properties of the propensity score
In order to examine the effectiveness of our matching procedure, we first assess
overlap in the propensity score both before and after the NMLLS is in place. Note that
tests conducted in this section use only information concerning covariates and residency
classification, and do not consider completion rates, therefore cannot intentionally
introduce bias in subsequent analyses. For a thorough treatment of these tests, see
Imbens and Rubin (2015).
Figure 2.A1 presents histogram estimates of the distribution of linearized
propensity scores before and after the implementation of the NMLLS, by residency. First
inspection reveals substantial overlap in the linearized propensity score across residents
and nonresidents, both before and after the NMLLS was launched. As a more formal
check, we calculate the percent of observations where there exists an observation of the
opposite treatment status with a difference in linearized propensity score less than 10
percent. These measures are presented in Table 2.A1. For residents, approximately 99
percent of students had at least one closely matching nonresident student in terms of
linearized propensity score both before and after the launch of the NMLLS. For
nonresidents, this percentage was approximately 97 percent. This suggests we should be
able to credibly estimate causal effects of the NMLLS on student graduation under the
assumption of unconfoundedness.
We next perform two tests assessing the balancing property of the propensity
score, which asserts that conditional on the propensity score, treatment assignment and
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student characteristics are independent of one another. We perform these tests both
before and after the NMLLS is launched. If results of these tests are favorable, this
constitutes evidence supporting the assumption of unconfoundedness, although it cannot
be directly tested. The balancing property can be formally represented as:
𝑊 ⫫ 𝑋 | 𝑙(𝑋 )

(2. 𝐴1)

where Wi is a binary treatment indicator equal to one if student i is a New Mexico
resident, and zero otherwise, Xi is a vector of covariates, and l(Xi) is the true linearized
propensity score. Because we do not know the true linearized propensity score, we
approximate this test by instead using its estimated counterpart, 𝑙 (𝑋 ). Our strategy is to
stratify the sample into J blocks, 𝐵 (1), … , 𝐵 (𝐽), so there will be no significant
difference between linearized propensity scores within each block. This way, (2.A1)
becomes
𝑊 ⫫ 𝑋 | 𝐵 (1), … , 𝐵 (𝐽).

(2. 𝐴2)

Equation (2.A2) can be examined by testing whether residency classification and
covariates are uncorrelated within each of the J blocks, so that
𝐸[𝑋 |𝑊 = 1, 𝐵 (𝑗) = 1] = 𝐸[𝑋 |𝑊 = 0, 𝐵 (𝑗) = 1]

(2. 𝐴3)

for all blocks, j = 1, …, J. Tables 2.A2 and 2.A3 present the results of this stratification
procedure. For the pre-NMLLS period, we split the sample into 11 blocks using the
linearized propensity score. Near the upper end of the propensity score distribution, we
were not able to further split blocks 10 and 11 due to a small number of nonresident
students relative to the number of resident students.46 We also encountered this issue
when stratifying the sample in the post-NMLLS period, although at the opposite end of
the propensity score distribution. We nonetheless consider the stratification successful,
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as only two of the 25 blocks created were left with propensity scores that were
significantly different across resident and nonresident groups at the five percent level.
With pre- and post-NMLLS samples stratified, we then assess covariate balance
within blocks. These tests can be thought of “pseudo treatment effects” as they examine
the effect of treatment on pre-treatment covariates, where the effects are a priori known
to be zero. Confirmation that pseudo treatment effects are zero constitutes evidence that
equation (2.A3) holds, supporting the assumption of unconfoundedness. We conduct two
different tests. First, we test separately, by each covariate, whether within-block
differences between residents and nonresidents are equal to zero. Second, for each
covariate we test whether the weighted average of within-block differences between
residents and nonresidents are equal to zero. Results of these tests for pre- and postNMLLS cohorts are reported in Tables 2.A4 and 2.A5, respectively.
We analyze the results of these tests as if data arose from a stratified random
experiment. The first approach for assessing covariate balance focuses on one covariateblock dyad at a time. We calculate z-statistics testing the null hypothesis that the
difference between residents and nonresidents in the dyad is equal to zero. These tests
produce a large amount of information, however they are not very informative when
examined individually. Of the 113 pre-NMLLS tests, only seven (six percent) had zstatistics above two. Similarly, of the 148 post-NMLLS tests, only twelve (eight percent)
exceeded two in absolute value. It is informative to present these statistics in Q-Q plots,
where z-values are compared against their expected values under independent draws from
a standard normal distribution. If the distributions of z-values closely follow the 45
degree lines in these plots, it is evidence that the propensity score was effective in
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balancing covariates as if treatment was randomly assigned within blocks. Q-Q plots are
presented in Figures 2.A2 and 2.A3. Both appear to follow the normal distribution
reasonably well, although they are slightly skewed to the right (especially for pretreatment cohorts). One major outlier deserves attention in Figure 2.A2—it is due to the
incomparability of black resident and nonresident students at UNM at a particular region
of the propensity score distribution.47
The column labeled as the overall t-statistic tests the null hypothesis that the
block-adjusted weighted average of within block differences is equal to zero. Finding zvalues larger in absolute value than we would expect if they were drawn independently
from a standard normal distribution is evidence that the stratification does not adequately
balance covariates, suggesting that the propensity score model is not satisfactory and may
need to be refined. According to Table 2.A4, there do not appear to be any significant
balance issues for pre-NMLLS cohorts. For these cohorts, the largest t-statistic we find is
1.73, suggesting excellent balance. Table 2.A5 reveals that there may exist some
imbalance in the high school GPA and ACT composite score covariates for post-NMLLS
cohorts. The z-statistics for these covariates are 2.17 and 2.14 in absolute value,
respectively, indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis that the weighted averages
of within-block differences are zero for both of these variables at the five percent level.
Analyzing normalized differences between residents and nonresidents for these
covariates after matching is performed provides an additional check as to whether this
imbalance requires estimating a more flexible propensity score or perhaps trimming the
sample. Although the propensity score model did not perform as well as would
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randomization into treatment within blocks, overall we feel it worked adequately in
balancing covariates across resident and nonresident students.
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Note: The left and right panels overlap linearized propensity scores for
residents and nonresidents before and after the implementation of the NMLLS,
respectively, allowing for visual inspection of sufficient overlap, a critical
requirement for successful propensity score matching. Both figures indicate
there is sufficient overlap of residents and nonresidents.
Figure 2.A1 Linearized propensity scores, by residency and NMLLS implementation
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Note: The left panel presents a normal Q-Q plot of t-statistics from within-block tests
before implementation of the NMLLS. Normal Q-Q plots graph actual percentiles
against theoretical percentages from a normal distribution with the same mean and
standard deviation. Normality is evidenced by a straight line of plotted values. Above
right is a histogram of the same t-statistics with a fitted normal curve. Both plots provide
visual evidence of slight positive skew.
Figure 2.A2 Visual check of normality of within-block differences across resident status,
pre-NMLLS
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Note: The left panel presents a normal Q-Q plot of t-statistics from within-block tests
after implementation of the NMLLS. Normal Q-Q plots graph actual percentiles against
theoretical percentages from a normal distribution with the same mean and standard
deviation. Normality is evidenced by a straight line of plotted values. Above right is a
histogram of the same t-statistics with a fitted normal curve. Again, both plots provide
visual evidence of slight positive skew.
Figure 2.A3 Visual check of normality of within-block differences across resident status,
post-NMLLS
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Table 2.A1 Proportion of units with match discrepancy in terms of linearized propensity
score less than 10 percent

Measure

Pre-NMLLS

Post-NMLLS

qnonresident

.971

.968

qresident

.989

.995
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Table 2.A2 Propensity score blocks and their boundaries, pre-NMLLS
Block

Lower

Upper

Width Nonresidents Residents

t-Statistic

1

.238

.688

.449

37

29

-.854

2

.688

.757

.070

24

43

-.796

3

.757

.800

.043

47

86

-.598

4

.800

.830

.030

57

209

-.057

5

.830

.843

.013

47

219

.054

6

.843

.851

.009

62

205

.154

7

.851

.888

.036

167

899

.783

8

.888

.920

.032

62

471

.304

9

.920

.945

.025

38

496

.065

10

.945

.961

.015

23

510

-3.274

11

.961

.985

.024

21

513

-1.519

Above presents results of an attempt to stratify the sample on the linearized
propensity score. t-statistics are for the null hypothesis of equality in linearized
propensity scores between resident and nonresident students. Blocks 10 and 11
could not be split further as there would be an insufficient number of members in
new groups for subsequent hypothesis testing.
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Table 2.A3. Propensity score blocks and their boundaries, post-NMLLS
Block

Lower

Upper

Width Nonresidents Residents

t-Statistic

1

.249

.717

.468

40

68

-3.393

2

.717

.780

.063

25

83

-1.314

3

.780

.813

.033

28

188

-1.493

4

.813

.832

.019

49

383

-.835

5

.832

.852

.020

110

758

.419

6

.852

.869

.017

109

755

-.516

7

.869

.888

.020

89

779

-.557

8

.889

.896

.007

36

180

-.292

9

.896

.904

.008

18

199

-.877

10

.904

.922

.017

26

407

-.971

11

.922

.937

.015

31

402

.328

12

.937

.946

.010

22

411

-1.339

13

.946

.962

.015

45

821

-.569

14

.962

.987

.025

20

846

-.390

Above presents results of an attempt to stratify the sample on the linearized
propensity score. t-statistics are for the null hypothesis of equality in linearized
propensity scores between resident and nonresident students. Block 1 could not
be split further as there would be an insufficient number of members in new
groups for subsequent hypothesis testing.
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Table 2.A4 Tests for balance conditional on propensity score, pre-NMLLS
Covariate

High School
GPA
Composite ACT
Remedial
Income < 20K
Income < 40K
Female
Hispanic
Native
Asian
Black
Declined

Within Blocks

Overall

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

t-Statistic

0.37
-0.94
-2.43
0.27
0.19
-0.83
-1.13
0.88
-1.41
-

-0.37
-2.31
0.22
-0.76
-0.85
-1.07
1.35
-0.74
1.35
-0.63
1.35

-1.81
-1.58
-0.85
-0.07
-0.85
0.05
-0.74
-1.69
-0.07
-1.29
-0.74

-2.21
-1.82
0.67
0.99
-0.90
-0.42
1.92
-0.54
1.93
-0.90
-0.91

1.51
-0.75
1.46
1.20
-0.45
0.58
2.76
-0.93
0.36
-0.46

-0.15
-0.60
-0.40
0.59
1.46
-0.90
-0.78
-0.07
0.08
-0.55
-

-0.74
0.09
0.01
-0.83
-0.47
0.50
-0.08
-0.39
-0.02
0.54
-1.30

-1.27
-1.35
0.45
-1.04
0.88
-1.91
0.73
-0.33
-1.23
5.08
0.11

-0.78
-0.56
-0.97
-0.36
-0.97
1.69
-0.58
0.01
2.64
-0.55
-0.48

-0.03
2.25
-0.92
0.40
-1.08
-0.74
0.12
0.53
-0.64
-0.21

-0.22
0.09
-0.83
0.35
0.29
0.16
1.31
-1.31
-

1.73
0.85
0.83
0.59
1.17
0.27
-0.76
-0.10
-0.03
-1.08
1.22

z-statistics test the null hypothesis of equality of means within blocks for resident and nonresident students. Overall tstatistics test the null hypothesis that the weighted average of differences across blocks is equal to zero. Declined is
equal to zero if the student declined to state their race-ethnicity, and zero otherwise.
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Table 2.A5: Tests for balance conditional on propensity score, post-NMLLS
Covariate

High School GPA
Composite ACT
Remedial
Income < 20K
Income < 40K
Female
Hispanic
Native
Asian
Black
Declined

Within Blocks
1
-1.88
-2.24
2.79
-0.11
1.28
-0.96
-0.77
1.47
-

2
-2.38
-0.63
1.45
-0.38
-0.16
-0.82
-0.55
-0.17
-0.55
0.55
2.66

3
-1.76
0.42
-0.43
-0.87
-1.25
-0.08
-0.67
-0.49
1.57
-0.58
-0.96

4
5
6
7
8
9
1.49 1.56 2.07 1.20 -0.19 0.67
2.35 1.90 -0.88 2.44 0.34 1.85
0.25 0.11 1.23 -1.97 0.74 -2.25
1.45 0.13 1.24 -0.54 0.17 0.66
0.35 -0.85 0.62 -0.14 -0.91 2.95
1.34 0.06 1.97 -0.07 -0.27 -1.02
-0.36 0.74 -0.85 0.45 -1.52 -0.44
-0.50 -0.35 0.69 -1.12 2.04 -0.16
1.04 -0.85 -1.58 -0.33 -0.25 0.20
-0.95 0.70 0.30 0.35 -0.78 -0.52
-0.88 0.29 0.43 1.24 -1.01 0.10

Overall
10
0.94
0.53
-0.99
-0.11
-0.87
0.75
0.53
0.16
-0.32
-0.72
2.83

11
1.50
-0.56
1.63
-1.06
-0.87
0.84
-1.04
0.83
0.74
-0.39
-0.84

12
0.82
0.57
-1.03
0.22
-0.15
1.25
-0.64
0.46
1.53
-0.57
-0.57

13
14
0.51 0.06
-0.15 0.54
1.46 -0.80
-0.61 0.66
-1.69 2.09
-0.58 0.10
-1.19 0.38
0.19 -0.15
1.55 -0.36
-0.41
-

t-Statistic
-2.17
-2.14
0.28
-0.33
-0.69
-1.14
0.86
-0.45
-0.06
0.38
-1.23

z-statistics test the null hypothesis of equality of means within blocks for resident and nonresident students. Overall t-statistics test
the null hypothesis that the weighted average of differences across blocks is equal to zero. Declined is equal to zero if the student
declined to state their race-ethnicity, and zero otherwise.
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Notes

46

In order to perform subsequent hypothesis testing, we are not able to further

split blocks where new blocks would have fewer members than K + 2, where K is the
number of covariates.
47

Although this outlier is visually striking, it is driven by the relatively small

number of black students at UNM (less than 3 percent of the sample).
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Appendix 2.B Alternative bandwidths

Table 2.B1 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with bandwidths of .1, .2, and .3; 19941999
Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment
Group

Obs.

4 Years

4 ½ Years

5 Years

6 Years

Full Sample
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

11,207
11,209
11,210

-.035
-.035
-.035

-.027
-.030
-.030

-.020
-.024
-.024

-.013
-.019
-.019

GPA ≤ 3.28
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

5,470
5,473
5,474

-.014
-.015
-.016

-.037
-.035
-.034

.064
-.069*
-.070*

-.082*
-.087**
-.089**

GPA > 3.28
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

5,732
5,734
5,735

-.026
-.022
-.023

.016
.016
.013

.066
.069
.067

.089*
.094*
.096*

GPA > 3.78
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

2,103
2,105
2,105

.041
.031
.034

.095
.082
.086

.098
.093
.103

.113
.107
.115

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from
difference-in-differences kernel matching using an Epanechnikov kernel function
with various bandwidth parameters, h. We report estimates for students with below
average or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (>
3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (>
3.78).
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Table 2.B2 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with bandwidths of 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3;
family income < $40,000; 1994-1999
Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment
Group

Obs.

4 Years

4 ½ Years

5 Years

6 Years

Full Sample
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

2,291
2,296
2,297

-.010
-.011
-.013

-.014
-.012
-.015

-.041
-.037
-.040

-.016
-.020
-.025

GPA ≤ 3.28
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

1,128
1,131
1,133

.003
.003
.004

-.013
-.018
-.019

-.206**
-.197**
-.183*

-.204**
-.202**
-.198**

GPA > 3.28
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

1,160
1,162
1,163

.047
.022
.017

.054
.037
.033

.180*
.161
.156

.226*
.200*
.205*

GPA > 3.78
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

403
404
404

-.086
-.091
-.071

-.036
-.032
-.012

.148
.151
.159

.054
.054
.060

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from
difference-in-differences kernel matching using an Epanechnikov kernel function
with various bandwidth parameters, h. We report estimates for students with below
average or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (>
3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (>
3.78).
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Table 2.B3 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with bandwidths of 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3;
family income ≥ $40,000; 1994-1999
Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment
Group

Obs.

4 Years

4 ½ Years

5 Years

6 Years

Full Sample
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

8,904
8,908
8,909

-.037
-.035
-.035

-.028
-.028
-.027

-.018
-.015
-.012

-.011
-.010
-.008

GPA ≤ 3.28
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

4,333
4,335
4,336

-.014
-.018
-.019

-.038
-.040
-.038

-.042
-.035
-.030

-.061
-.055
-.052

GPA > 3.28
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

4,569
4,571
4,571

-.030
-.027
-.032

.014
.011
.005

.029
.033
.030

.049
.058
.056

GPA > 3.78
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

1,699
1,701
1,701

.052
.055
.055

.110
.109
.109

.089
.096
.106

.123
.130
.139*

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from
difference-in-differences kernel matching using an Epanechnikov kernel function with
various bandwidth parameters, h. We report estimates for students with below average
or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and
high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78).
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Appendix 2.C Alternative sets of cohorts

Table 2.C1 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with alternative cohort sets
Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment
Group

Obs.

4 Years

4 ½ Years

5 Years

6 Years

Full Sample
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

12,755
15,208
11,209
13,715

-.022
-.037*
-.035
-.047**

-.011
-.032
-.030
-.047*

.010
-.002
-.024
-.030

.024
.018
-.019
-.015

GPA ≤ 3.28
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

6,309
7,510
5,473
6,706

-.015
-.012
-.015
-.016

-.027
-.041
-.035
-.052**

-.031
-.045
-.069*
-.076**

-.033
-.038
-.087**
-.084**

GPA > 3.28
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

6,441
7,696
5,734
7,009

-.011
-.038
-.022
-.046

.024
.003
.016
-.003

.082*
.067
.069
.063

.107**
.096**
.094*
.098**

GPA > 3.78
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

2,359
2,838
2,105
2,583

-.004
-.061
.031
-.019

.080
.018
.082
-.031

.117
.084
.093
.073

.103
.080
.107
.094

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from
difference-in-differences kernel matching using an Epanechnikov kernel function with
various bandwidth parameters, h. We report estimates for students with below average
or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and
high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78).
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Table 2.C2 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with alternative cohort sets, family
income < $40,000
Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment
Group

Obs.

4 Years

4 ½ Years

5 Years

6 Years

Full Sample
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

2,611
3,009
2,296
2,749

.045
.008
-.011
-.052

.053
-.016
-.012
-.078*

.062
-.001
-.037
-.094

.047
.005
-.020
-.074

GPA ≤ 3.28
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

1,291
1,505
1,131
1,379

.007
.002
.003
-.002

.012
-.045
-.018
-.053

-.105
-.145*
-.197**
-.190***

-.131
-.145*
-.202**
-.171**

GPA > 3.28
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

1,318
1,503
1,162
1,369

.116
.003
.022
-.083

.127
.008
.037
-.069

.269***
.150
.161
.061

.229*
.173
.200*
.097

GPA > 3.78
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

456
518
404
467

-.031
-.160
-.091
-.178

-.0002
-.129
-.032
-.102

.199
.145
.151
.174

-.114
.049
.054
.124

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from
difference-in-differences kernel matching using an Epanechnikov kernel function with
various bandwidth parameters, h. We report estimates for students with below average
or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and
high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78).
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Table 2.C3 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with alternative cohort sets, family
income ≥ $40,000
Graduation Rates by Years since First Enrollment
Group

Obs.

4 Years

4 ½ Years

5 Years

6 Years

Full Sample
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

10,140
12,195
8,908
10,955

-.030
-.046*
-.035
-.048*

-.019
-.036
-.028
-.042

.005
-.004
-.015
-.014

.022
.017
-.010
-.001

GPA ≤ 3.28
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

5,015
6,001
4,335
5,316

-.020
-.016
-.018
-.017

-.039
-.046
-.040
-.049

-.014
-.022
-.035
-.026

-.010
-.011
-.055
-.038

GPA > 3.28
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

5,121
6,192
4,571
5,639

-.017
-.044
-.027
-.043

.024
.006
.011
.002

.055
.050
.033
.045

.078*
.075
.058
.075

GPA > 3.78
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

1,902
2,320
1,701
2,116

-.0001
-.042
.055
-.012

.102
.052
.109
.041

.113
.083
.096
.059

.141*
.101
.130
.100

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from
difference-in-differences kernel matching using an Epanechnikov kernel function with
various bandwidth parameters, h. We report estimates for students with below average
or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and
high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78).
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Appendix 2.D Accumulation of credits models
Table 2.D1 Cumulative credit-taking by year since first enrollment, difference-indifferences kernel matching, 1994-1999
Cumulative Credits by Year Since First Enrollment
Group

Obs.

Full Sample 11,209

𝑌
GPA ≤ 3.28

5,473

𝑌
GPA > 3.28

5,734

𝑌
GPA > 3.78

𝑌

2,105

1

2

3

4

5

6

-.374
(.755)

-.633
(1.673)

.094
(2.610)

.359
(3.443)

1.160
(3.899)

1.903
(4.098)

21.834

40.315

56.372

71.446

81.615

86.387

-1.480
(1.016)

-3.361
(2.279)

-3.453
(3.611)

-5.793
(4.586)

-7.465
(5.291)

-7.693
(5.591)

19.040

33.752

46.131

57.592

66.780

57.591

1.777** 4.123* 6.757** 10.809** 13.957*** 15.355***
(.902) (2.104) (3.268) (4.517)
(5.172)
(5.395)
24.679

46.700

66.804

88.558

96.748

101.866

-.594
(1.199)

1.099
(3.128)

5.319
(5.289)

10.470
(7.472)

12.735
(8.310)

14.802*
(8.557)

27.376

53.024

76.187

98.428

109.629

114.472

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from differencein-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using the
Epanechnikov kernel function. We report estimates for students with below average or
average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and high
school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78). 𝑌 denotes
baseline cumulative credits earned by high school performance and years since first
enrollment for resident students.
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Table 2.D2 Cumulative credit-taking by year since first enrollment, difference-indifferences kernel matching, family income < $40,000, 1994-1999

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from differencein-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using the
Epanechnikov kernel function. We report estimates for students with below average or
average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and high
school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78). 𝑌 denotes
baseline cumulative credits earned by high school performance and years since first
enrollment for resident students.
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Table 2.D3 Cumulative credit-taking by year since first enrollment, difference-indifferences kernel matching, family income ≥ $40,000, 1994-1999
Cumulative Credits by Year Since First Enrollment
Group
Full Sample

Obs.
8,908

𝑌
GPA ≤ 3.28

4,335

𝑌
GPA > 3.28

4,571

𝑌
GPA > 3.78

𝑌

1,701

1 Year

2 Years

3 Years

4 Years

5 Years

6 Years

-.301
(.795)

-.980
(1.848)

-.523
(2.853)

-.227
(3.846)

.831
1.697
(4.344) (34.532)

22.107

40.872

57.210

72.559

82.778

87.382

-.848
(1.168)

-3.147
(2.596)

-2.789
(4.022)

-5.251
(5.250)

-6.2137
(6.009)

-6.337
(6.377)

19.290

34.235

46.831

58.612

62.083

72.437

.860
(.880)

1.810
(2.169)

2.973
(3.414)

6.085
(4.774)

8.551
(5.428)

10.097*
(5.630)

24.979

47.641

67.793

86.781

97.964

102.623

-.395
(1.311)

1.913
(3.311)

6.943
(5.510)

12.085
(7.756)

14.463
(8.659)

16.734*
(8.976)

27.613

53.793

77.568

100.236

111.264 115.802

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from differencein-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using the
Epanechnikov kernel function. We report estimates for students with below average or
average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and high
school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78). 𝑌 denotes
baseline cumulative credits earned by high school performance and years since first
enrollment for resident students.
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Appendices to Chapter 3
Appendix 3.A Mathematical derivations

Recall 𝑟 is the discount rate, 𝑌 and 𝑌 are earnings with a high school diploma and a
baccalaureate degree, respectively, and 𝐹 is direct full-time schooling costs per year.
Students prefer a six-year, .75 FTE (i.e., 30 hour per week) employment approach to
traditional baccalaureate degree attainment (i.e., .25 FTE, four-year path) when
(3.A1) ∑

(

)

+∑

(

−∑

)

(

)

> ∑

(

)

+∑

(

)

−∑

(

)

.

To simplify this expression, we pull out constant terms from the summation operators,
combine like terms, and apply the rule of finite geometric series which states that
(3.A2) ∑

𝑎 =

(

)

,

giving the following equation:
(3.A3)
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+𝐹 ∑
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−
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Removing summation notation for the second and third terms allows the expression to be
reduced to:
(3.A4)

− (𝑌 + 𝐹)

−

(

)

+(

)

>0

Simplifying the second term and adding it to both sides produces:
(3.A5)

> (𝑌 + 𝐹)

−

(

)

Moving all the discount rate parameters to the left-hand side and simplifying yields the
solution in equation (2):
(3.A6)

(

)

(
(

)
)

>

[

]

.
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Appendix 3.B U.S. News & World Report Classification
Table 3.B1 U.S. News & World Report College Rankings, by institution type, 2005
Highly Selective Private Schools
Top 50 Public Schools
University of California–Berkeley
University of Virginia
University of Michigan–Ann Arbor
University of California–Los Angeles
University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill
College of William and Mary
University of Wisconsin–Madison
University of California–San Diego
University of Illinois
Georgia Institute of Technology
University of California–Davis
University of California–Irvine
University of California–Santa Barbara
University of Texas–Austin
University of Washington
Pennsylvania State University
University of Florida
University of Maryland–College Park
Rutgers University–New Brunswick
University of Georgia
University of Iowa
Miami University (Ohio)
Ohio State University
Purdue University
Texas A&M–College Station
University of Connecticut
University of Delaware
University of Minnesota–Twin Cities
Indiana University
Michigan State University
Clemson University

Top 65 Private Schools
Harvard University
Princeton University
Yale University
University of Pennsylvania
Duke University
MIT
Stanford University
California Institute of Tech.
Columbia University
Dartmouth College
Northwestern University
Washington Univ. of St. Louis
Brown University
Cornell University
Johns Hopkins University
University of Chicago
Rice University
Notre Dame University
Vanderbilt University
Emory University
Carnegie Mellon University
Georgetown University
Wake Forest University
Tufts University
Univ. of Southern California
Brandeis University
New York University
Case Western Reserve
Lehigh University
Univ. of Rochester
Tulane University

Top 50 Liberal Arts Schools
Amherst College
Williams College
Swarthmore College
Wellesley College
Carleton College
Middlebury College
Pomona College
Bowdoin College
Davidson College
Haverford College
Claremont-McKenna
Wesleyan University
Grinnell College
Vassar College
Harvey Mudd College
Washington and Lee
Smith College
Hamilton College
Colgate University
Oberlin College
Colby College
Bates College
Bryn Mawr College
Colorado College
Macalester College
Scripps College
Mt. Holyoke College
Barnard College
Kenyon College
College of the Holy Cross
Trinity College

Note: Adopted from Bound et al. (2012) and the 2005 U.S. News & World Report College Rankings.
Highly selective private colleges also include the four U.S. Armed Services Academies: the U.S. Military
Academy at Westpoint, the U.S. Naval Academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, and the U.S. Air
Force Academy.
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Table 3.B1 U.S. News & World Report College Rankings, by Institution Type, 2005
(continued)
Highly Selective Private Schools
Top 50 Public Schools
SUNY at Binghamton
University of California–Santa Cruz
University of Colorado–Boulder
Virginia Tech.
University of California–Riverside
Iowa State University
North Carolina State University
University of Alabama
University of Missouri–Columbia
Auburn University
University of Kansas
University of Tennessee–Knoxville
University of Vermont
Ohio University
University of Arizona
University of Massachusetts–Amherst
University of Nebraska–Lincoln
University of New Hampshire

Top 65 Private Schools
Rensselaer Polytechnic
Yeshiva University
George Washington Univ.
Pepperdine University
Syracuse University
Worcester Polytechnic
Boston University
University of Miami
Fordham University
Southern Methodist Univ.
Brigham Young University
Clark University
Stevens Inst. of Technology
St. Louis University
Baylor University
American University
Howard University
Marquette University
University of Denver
University of Tulsa
Texas Christian University
University of Dayton
Drexel University
Illinois Institute of Technology
University of San Diego
Catholic University
Loyola University
Univ. of San Francisco
University of the Pacific
New School
Northeastern University
Seton Hall University
University of St. Thomas

Top 50 Liberal Arts Schools
Lafayette College
Occidental College
Bard College
Furman University
Whitman College
Union College
Franklin and Marshall
Sewanee College
University of Richmond
Connecticut College
Centre College
Dickinson College
Skidmore College
Gettysburg College
Pitzer College
DePauw University
Rhodes College
Reed College

Note: Adopted from Bound et al. (2012) and the 2005 U.S. News & World Report College Rankings.
Highly selective private colleges also include the four U.S. Armed Services Academies: the U.S. Military
Academy at Westpoint, the U.S. Naval Academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, and the U.S. Air
Force Academy.
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Appendices to Chapter 4
Appendix 4.A Flexible difference-in-differences results
Table 4.A1 Common trends assumption test, American Community Survey definition,
1994-1999
Leads/Lags

First Declared

Degree Earned

NMLLS t-3

.026
(.037)

.064
(.075)

NMLLS t-2

-.052
(.040)

-.018
(.081)

NMLLS t-1

-.058
(.042)

.050
(.073)

NMLLS t0

.026
(.037)

-.003
(.074)

NMLLS t+1

.009
(.036)

.070
(.070)

R2

.0609

.1249

Prob > F

.464

.666

11,258

4,453

Observations

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Ordinary least
squares estimates for all students entering UNM between 1994 –
1999 given. Reported coefficients are on interactions between
cohort years and a resident dummy variable. Models include
resident and cohort dummies as well as controls for race,
ethnicity, standardized test scores, high school GPA, gender, and
family income. The period t0 is 1997, the year the NMLLS was
implemented. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. NMLLS t+2 (1999) serves
as the base year. Prob > F displays the p-value of the null
hypothesis that estimated coefficients on leading periods are
jointly different from zero.
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Appendix 4.B. Categorizing of STEM majors

Table 4.B1 Majors classified as STEM according to the American Community Survey
ACS Code

ACS Code Description

2402
2403
2404
2405
2406
2407
2408
2409
2410
2411
2412
2413
2414
2415
2416
2417
2418
2419
2499
2500
2501
2502
2503
2504
2599
3600
3601
3602
3603
3604
3605
3606
3607
3608
3609
3611
3699

Biological engineering
Architectural engineering
Biomedical engineering
Chemical engineering
Civil engineering
Computer engineering
Electrical engineering
Engineering mechanics, physics, and science
Environmental engineering
Geological and geophysical engineering
Industrial and manufacturing engineering
Materials engineering and materials science
Mechanical engineering
Metallurgical engineering
Mining and mineral engineering
Naval architecture and marine engineering
Nuclear engineering
Petroleum engineering
Miscellaneous engineering
Engineering technologies
Engineering and industrial management
Electrical engineering technology
Industrial production technologies
Mechanical engineering related technologies
Miscellaneous engineering technologies
Biology
Biochemical sciences
Botany
Molecular biology
Ecology
Genetics
Microbiology
Pharmacology
Physiology
Zoology
Neuroscience
Miscellaneous biology
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Table 4.B1 (continued)
ACS Code

ACS Code Description

3700
3701
3702
3801
4002
4003
4005
4006
5000
5001
5002
5003
5004
5005
5006
5007
5008
5098
5102
5901
6106
6108
6202
6212

Mathematics
Applied mathematics
Statistics and decision science
Military technologies
Nutrition sciences
Neuroscience
Mathematics and computer science
Cognitive science and biopsychology
Physical sciences
Astronomy and astrophysics
Atmospheric sciences and meteorology
Chemistry
Geology and earth science
Geosciences
Oceanography
Physics
Materials science
Multi-disciplinary or general science
Nuclear, industrial radiology, and biological technologies
Transportation sciences and technologies
Health and medical preparatory programs
Pharmacy, pharmaceutical sciences, and administration
Actuarial science
Miscellaneous information systems and statistics

The code list from the American Community Survey was referenced 22 Jan
2018 and can be found online at
https://www2.census.gov/programssurveys/acs/tech_docs/code_lists/2016_AC
S_Code_Lists.pdf. See Sjoquist and Winters (2015a) for a more exhaustive list
that categorizes majors into other categories including liberal arts, healthrelated, social sciences, education, and business.
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Table 4.B2 Majors classified as STEM according to the STEM Collaborative Center at
the University of New Mexico, Broad Definition
Major Code(s)

Major Description

5, ANTH
6, ARCH
249, BIOC
12, BIOL
15, CHE
16, CHEM
17, CE
171, CPE
109, 168, ACS, CS
262, CONE
263, 474, CMGT, CONM
22, 23, DEHY, DHYG
340, EPS
27, ECON
173, EE
379, EMS
438, ENSC
371, GENG
46, GEOG
481, HMHV
INGV
110
64, MATH
65, ME
353, MEDL
76, NE
77, 456, NUR, NURS
24, NDIT
81, PHYC
405, PAP
FANT
FBIC
FBIO
FCH
FCHM
FCE
FCP
FCS
FEPS
FECO

Anthropology
Architecture
Biochemistry
Biology
Chemical Engineering
Chemistry
Civil Engineering
Computer Engineering
Computer Science
Construction Engineering
Construction Management
Dental Hygiene
Earth and Planetary Sciences
Economics
Electrical Engineering
Emergency Medical Services
Environmental Science
General Engineering
Geography
Health, Medicine and Human Values
Integrative Studies
Management Information Systems
Mathematics
Mechanical Engineering
Medical Laboratory Sciences
Nuclear Engineering
Nursing
Nutrition/Dietetics
Physics
Physics and Astrophysics
Pre Anthropology
Pre Biochemistry
Pre Biology
Pre Chemical Engineering
Pre Chemistry
Pre Civil Engineering
Pre Computer Engineering
Pre Computer Science
Pre Earth and Planetary Sciences
Pre Economics
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Table 4.B2 (continued)
Major Code(s)

Major Description

FEE
FESC

Pre Electrical Engineering
Pre Environmental Science

The code list was provided by the Office of Institutional Analytics at the University of New
Mexico. STEM-designated majors are according to the University of New Mexico STEM
Collaborative Center and can be found online at https://stem.unm.edu/tools-for-faculty-andstaff/5517-broad-data.pdf (accessed 24 Jan 2018). This is considered the “broad” list of STEM
majors at the University of New Mexico.
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Table 4.B3 Majors classified as STEM according to the STEM Collaborative Center at
the University of New Mexico, Narrow Definition
Major Code(s)

Major Description

249, BIOC
12, BIOL
15, CHE
16, CHEM
17, CE
171, CPE
109, 168, ACS, CS
262, CONE
263, 474, CMGT, CONM
340, EPS
173, EE
438, ENSC
371, GENG
64, MATH
65, ME
76, NE
81, PHYC
405, PAP
FANT
FBIC
FBIO
FCH
FCHM
FCE
FCP
FCS
FCOE
FCON
FEPS
FEE
FESC
FMAT
FME

Biochemistry
Biology
Chemical Engineering
Chemistry
Civil Engineering
Computer Engineering
Computer Science
Construction Engineering
Construction Management
Earth and Planetary Sciences
Electrical Engineering
Environmental Science
General Engineering
Mathematics
Mechanical Engineering
Nuclear Engineering
Physics
Physics and Astrophysics
Pre Anthropology
Pre Biochemistry
Pre Biology
Pre Chemical Engineering
Pre Chemistry
Pre Civil Engineering
Pre Computer Engineering
Pre Computer Science
Pre Construction Engineering
Pre Construction Management
Pre Earth and Planetary Science
Pre Electrical Engineering
Pre Environmental Science
Pre Mathematics
Pre Mechanical Engineering
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Table 4.B3 (continued)
FNE
FPHY
FSTA
STAT

Pre Nuclear Engineering
Pre Physics
Pre Statistics
Statistics

The code list was provided by the University of New Mexico. STEM-designated majors
are according to the University of New Mexico STEM Collaborative Center and can be
found online at https://stem.unm.edu/common/pdfs/17-benchmarking-narrow.pdf
(accessed 5 Feb 2018). This is considered the “narrow” list of STEM majors at the
University of New Mexico.
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Appendix 4.C Alternative STEM definitions

Table 4.C1 NMLLS and major choice by academic preparation, UNM narrow STEM
definition, 1994-1999
Group
Full Sample

Obs.
11,209

5,473

5,734

𝑌

.022
(.029)

4,692

.009
(.052)

-.022
(.031)

.194
1,574

.084*
(.045)

2,105

-.099
(.063)
.299

.121
(.086)
.110

3,117

.312

𝑌
HSGPA > 3.78

Majored in STEM

.153

𝑌
HSGPA > 3.28

Obs.

.197

𝑌
HSGPA ≤ 3.28

First Declared STEM

-.011
(.068)
.238

1,357

-.094
(.099)
.332

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from
difference-in-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using
the Epanechnikov kernel function. We report estimates for students with below
average or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (>
3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (>
3.78). 𝑌 denotes the baseline rate of STEM major choice by academic preparation.
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Table 4.C2 NMLLS and major choice by academic preparation, UNM broad STEM
definition, 1994-1999
Group
Full Sample

Obs.
11,209

5,473

5,734

𝑌

.025
(.033)

4,692

-.033
(.057)

-.009
(.041)

.276
1,574

.079*
(.047)

2,105

-.126*
(.067)
.364

.065
(.096)
.187

3,117

.312

𝑌
HSGPA > 3.78

Majored in STEM

.217

𝑌
HSGPA > 3.28

Obs.

.264

𝑌
HSGPA ≤ 3.28

First Declared STEM

-.054
(.072)
.323

1,357

-.112
(.103)
.400

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from
difference-in-differences kernel matching performed with a bandwidth of h = .2 using
the Epanechnikov kernel function. We report estimates for students with below
average or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (>
3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (>
3.78). 𝑌 denotes the baseline rate of STEM major choice by academic preparation.
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Appendix 4.D Alternative bandwidths

Table 4.D1 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with bandwidths of 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3;
1994-1999
STEM First Declared
Group

Obs.

Estimate

Full Sample
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

11,207
11,209
11,210

.025
.026
.027

GPA ≤ 3.28
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

5,470
5,473
5,474

-.063*
-.068*
-.057

GPA > 3.28
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

5,732
5,734
5,735

.115**
.121***
.119***

GPA > 3.78
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

2,103
2,105
2,105

-.088
-.063
-.049

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level,
respectively. Estimates are from difference-in-differences kernel
matching using an Epanechnikov kernel function with various
bandwidth parameters, h. We report estimates for students with
below average or average high school GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average
high school GPAs (> 3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one
standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78).
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Table 4.D2 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with bandwidths of 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3;
1994-1999
STEM Degree Earned
Group

Obs.

Estimate

Full Sample
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

4,437
4,438
4,439

-.024
-.012
-.016

GPA ≤ 3.28
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

1,506
1,507
1,508

.156*
.147
.134

GPA > 3.28
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

2,929
2,930
2,930

-.045
-.051
-.065

GPA > 3.78
h = 0.1
h = 0.2
h = 0.3

1,271
1,271
1,271

-.028
-.061
-.118

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively.
Estimates are from difference-in-differences kernel matching using an
Epanechnikov kernel function with various bandwidth parameters, h. We
report estimates for students with below average or average high school
GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and high school
GPAs greater than one standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78).
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Appendix 4.E Alternative cohorts

Table 4.E1 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with alternative cohort sets
First Declared STEM Major
Group

Obs.

Estimate

Full Sample
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

12,788
15,308
11,209
13,756

.027
.013
.026
.012

GPA ≤ 3.28
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

6,335
7,564
5,473
6,725

-.036
-.072
-.068*
-.097**

GPA > 3.28
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

6,451
7,742
5,734
7,029

.091**
.079**
.121***
.112**

GPA > 3.78
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

2,364
2,860
2,105
2,601

-.025
-.018
-.063
-.054

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *,
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5,
and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates are from
difference-in-differences kernel matching using an
Epanechnikov kernel function with various freshmen
cohorts included. We report estimates for students
with below average or average high school GPAs (≤
3.28), above average high school GPAs (> 3.28), and
high school GPAs greater than one standard deviation
above the mean (> 3.78).
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Table 4.E2 NMLLS kernel matching estimates with alternative cohort sets
Earned STEM Degree
Group

Obs.

Estimate

Full Sample
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

4,932
5,953
4,438
5,466

-.024
.001
-.012
.002

GPA ≤ 3.28
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

1,712
2,037
1,507
1,836

.165*
.165**
.147
.155*

GPA > 3.28
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

3,219
3,915
2,930
3,629

-.068
-.040
-.051
-.034

GPA > 3.78
1993 – 1999
1993 – 2000
1994 – 1999
1994 – 2000

1,400
1,711
1,271
1,581

-.104
-.083
-.061
-.062

Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the
10, 5, and 1 percent-level, respectively. Estimates
are from difference-in-differences kernel matching
using an Epanechnikov kernel function with various
freshmen cohorts included. We report estimates for
students with below average or average high school
GPAs (≤ 3.28), above average high school GPAs (>
3.28), and high school GPAs greater than one
standard deviation above the mean (> 3.78).
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